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EVIDENCE-BASED LITIGATION REFORM 
Mark Spottswood* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When we seek to assess the impact of existing rules of legal procedure 
or propose improvements to them, we are faced with stubborn questions 
defying easy answers.  Who will benefit from a new rule?  Who might be 
harmed?  Will the rule cost more, or add delay to the resolution of cases?  
And perhaps most importantly, will the legal system as a whole become 
more just or fair if the rule is adopted?   
When trying to answer such questions, we encounter a poverty of useful 
data.  We can rely on our intuitions and theoretic understandings to choose 
between possible rules, but history is littered with examples of well-
intentioned rule reform that led to effects drastically different from what 
rule designers imagined.1  For instance, when the enactors of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure added summary judgment and fact discovery to 
the litigation toolkit, they failed to envision the future they were creating, in 
which discovery became the most time-intensive aspect of litigation 
practice and summary judgment disposed of more cases than trials did.2  
Their failure to anticipate these things is not unusual, and it should not be 
surprising.  The litigation system is vastly complex, and how it will change 
in response to a new rule depends on obscure interactions between a new 
rule, the background matrix of existing rules and practices, the preferences 
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 1  See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
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of the many players involved, and their strategic adaptations and counter-
adaptations to new realities.3   
A number of other disciplines face similar design challenges.  It is also 
hard to predict how the human body will react to a new drug, how a change 
in a product’s design or manufacture will impact its reliability or safety, or 
how well a new regulatory policy will achieve the goals of its designers.   
At times policymakers in these other fields have relied on their intuitive 
understanding of how a system works to make inferences about the results 
of a new intervention.  Sometimes this may go very well, but it might also 
go disastrously wrong.  
To take just one chilling example, note the long-standing use of 
bloodletting as a therapeutic tool in medicine.4  Therapeutic exsanguination 
persisted for millennia before a few enterprising physicians decided to test 
the theory that it improved health outcomes.5  It turned out, of course, that it 
was bad for most patients to be bled, but this was not obvious before the 
systematic collection of data.6  Looking at individual case anecdotes in the 
absence of controlled experiments, it was simply impossible to tell whether 
practices like bloodletting were saving lives or not.  The rise of the more 
effective medicine we now enjoy was driven by a turn to evidence-based 
evaluation of both disease theory and therapeutic effectiveness, and could 
not have occurred absent a willingness to conduct controlled experiments as 
a means of identifying which therapies work and which ones do not.7  More 
recently, the evidence-based medicine movement has offered strong 
arguments that medical care could be further improved if doctors depended 
more on experimental verification of treatments and less on intuition.8 
Unfortunately, given our present methods of evaluating procedural 
success, we have little cause to be confident that our existing legal rules 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 3  See Ronald J. Allen, Taming Complexity: Rationality, the Law of Evidence, and the Nature of the 
Legal System 16–17 (Thirteenth Int’l Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law Workshop on 
Artificial Intelligence & Evidential Inference, Working Paper No. 11-52, 2011), available at 
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 4  See Edward Shorter, Primary Care, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 103, 109 (Roy 
Porter ed., 2006). 
 5  See id. at 108–10. 
 6  See id.; see also M. WEATHERALL, IN SEARCH OF A CURE: A HISTORY OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
DISCOVERY 16 (1990). 
 7  See generally discussion infra Part II. 
 8  Cf. Jeffrey A. Claridge & Timothy C. Fabian, History and Development of Evidence-Based 
Medicine, 29 WORLD J. SURGERY 547, 547 (2005). 
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work any better than bleeding and purging a sick patient.  Like medieval 
doctors, we watch the patient (that is, individual cases) with some care, but 
we rarely try to systematically measure the differential effects of competing 
rules on case outcomes.  What is worse, even when we do try to measure 
the effects of procedural rules, our investigations routinely neglect to 
measure the impact of a rule on the accuracy of case outcomes when we 
attempt to evaluate its effectiveness.  This problem is a grave one.  
Outcome accuracy—meaning a correspondence between the factual 
understandings that motivate legal decision makers and the historical facts 
that gave rise to litigation—is among the most important values that we try 
to optimize through procedural rules.9  But because we have never tried to 
systematically measure the accuracy of case outcomes, our ability to 
estimate the accuracy of civil and criminal case outcomes is severely 
limited. 
Some may object that outcome accuracy is something that cannot be 
measured effectively,10 but this is not the case.  In order to measure the 
accuracy of case outcomes in general, we must first parse the concept of 
accuracy into a measurable form, and then create “gold standard” methods 
for assessing it.  I propose one potential measurement protocol in this 
Article that might be able to allow some systematic measurement of factual 
accuracy in procedural outcomes, while acknowledging that this solution 
would be costly to implement on a large scale.  In brief, this protocol entails 
obtaining a record of what facts motivate those who are responsible for 
producing legal outcomes, and then comparing those beliefs with the results 
of a more detailed, in-depth investigation into the factual background of a 
case.  This protocol could be implemented on a relatively small scale if 
researchers are interested in particular questions regarding procedural 
validity, but it could also be scaled up as a basis for inter-systemic 
comparisons. 
Although it might seem that such investigations would be second best 
to the outcome of a trial on the merits, this objection turns out to be less 
weighty than it seems, because the vast majority of cases are either settled 
or decided on a pretrial motion.11  We have good reason to worry that in 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 9  See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183–85 (2004). 
 10  Cf. Steven B. Duke et al., A Picture’s Worth a Thousand Words: Conversational Versus 
Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2007) (noting, for one 
example, that most think of DNA evidence as a “gold standard” means of assessing verdict accuracy, but 
that it is available and dispositive in only a small percentage of criminal cases). 
 11  See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 
161–64 (1986). 
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many such cases, key decision makers know only a fraction of the 
information that a jury trial might produce.12  Nor is it fatal to an evidence-
based litigation reform project that many cases involve fundamentally 
ambiguous records or “he said, she said” credibility disputes.13  A proper 
system for measuring outcome accuracy should be able to separately 
categorize those cases that the legal system viewed as close, and if legal 
decision makers and gold standard reference investigators agree that cases 
involve difficult ambiguities, then the legal decisions can be said to be just 
as accurate as when investigators and decision makers agree that a case has 
only one clearly correct outcome.  But such an investigation would also 
help reveal when cases appear ambiguous only because insufficient 
investigation has been performed, or when cases are thought to have clear 
right answers only because complicating evidence has been ignored.    
Unless and until we investigate the ways that our existing procedural 
devices affect outcome accuracy, we should have little confidence that any 
of our procedures are particularly effective ways of generating factually 
valid legal results at acceptable cost.  Although a few scholars, following 
Charles Nesson, might wish to ignore evidence about our system’s accuracy 
if it undermines public confidence in verdicts,14 more will think that we 
should attend to both the system’s accuracy and its legitimacy when 
designing rules.15   Nor is the problem of inaccurate outcomes of merely 
theoretic interest.  Inaccurate outcomes involve chilling social costs: some 
people go to jail for crimes they did not commit, some are forced to pay 
others for wrongs they did not cause, and some who deserve punishment or 
sanction evade it.  Every so often, we get a brief window into the defects in 
our procedures.  A prominent recent example, from the criminal procedure 
arena, was the rise of DNA evidence.  Suddenly, a new forensic technique 
showed that many “ordinary” criminal convictions, which had seemed as 
reliable as most other case outcomes, were factually invalid.16  But since we 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 12  See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 816–17 
(2011) (describing the practice norms of many settlement-focused law firms, in which there is little 
attorney-client contact or attorney investigation into case facts). 
 13  Cf. Alex Stein, An Essay on Uncertainty and Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation, with Special 
Reference to Contract Cases, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 300 (1998) (explaining that fact-finding 
inherently involves unknowable uncertainty, due to the frequent situation of “evidential scarcity” that 
bedevils real-world litigation). 
 14  Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1358–59 (1985). 
 15  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 16  See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG 1–13 (2011); Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 70 (2003) (noting 
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rarely get such insight into the validity of case outcomes, the real harms of 
inaccurate resolutions are mostly hidden from our sight. 
In this Article, I attempt to show the need for investigations into the 
causal effects of procedural rules on the accuracy of case outcomes.  
Drawing on examples from the medical literature, I sketch out what would 
be involved in trying to measure the impact of various procedural rules on 
the accuracy of case outcomes.  Although such research could, for the first 
time, enable us to identify which procedures succeed at resolving cases 
accurately and which do not, it would also be expensive and difficult.  
Nevertheless, if we value accurate litigation outcomes a great deal, we 
might wish to bear these burdens, as we already do in the name of 
protecting our health. 
After imagining what a more evidence-based world of procedural 
design might require, I then turn to consider what we might learn about 
existing procedural debates and problems by comparing current practice to 
that idealized approach.  One sobering implication is that the existing 
empirical literature on litigation rules may have less to teach us than we 
might hope.  So long as we fail to measure accuracy, information about the 
variables we can track cannot provide a strong platform on which to base 
rule-design decisions, because we can never be sure that improvements in 
other procedural values are not coming at the expense of the system’s 
accuracy.   
At the same time, this discussion has important implications for those 
with the power to make new rules, even if they are unwilling to do the hard 
work needed to systematically test the accuracy effects of existing 
procedures.  In particular, I urge that rules be made in a way that both 
allows continuing evaluation of comparative data and that incorporates as 
wide a spectrum of on-the-ground experience as possible.  On the spectrum 
of possibilities, this means that the best rules will be those tested out first on 
a local level and then made broadly applicable through the formal rule 
making process.  Conversely, rules established by constitutional mandate 
from high-level courts will tend to be under-informed and will stifle our 
ability to test the premises that prompted their announcement.   
This Article will proceed in five parts.  First, I will discuss the rise of an 
evidence-based research culture in Western medicine in order to highlight 
some of the lessons that legal reformers can learn both from its successes 
and from its continuing struggles.  Second, I will make the case for why an 
evidence-based approach could be a valuable change to the way that 
                                                                                                                           
that “[u]ntil the moment when the DNA test results came back, almost none of these cases [in which 
DNA evidence revealed that a conviction was in error] would have been considered exceptional among 
criminal cases”). 
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juridical procedures are designed, and why existing attempts at data 
collection fall short of being able to facilitate such an approach.  In this 
discussion, I will draw primarily on examples in civil procedure, although 
similar observations could be applied to rule design in criminal procedure 
or evidence.  Third, I will address the difficulties that such a movement will 
face, with particular emphasis on the importance of developing a gold 
standard baseline for assessing the accuracy of case outcomes.  Fourth, I 
will discuss a research design that might address these problems and make 
systematic accuracy measurement an achievable possibility.  Finally, I will 
discuss some of the smaller steps we could take towards evidence-based 
litigation reform.  
II. THE BENEFITS OF EVIDENCE-DRIVEN DESIGN: THE MEDICAL EXAMPLE 
Before discussing the problems I see in existing approaches to 
evaluating the impacts of rules of legal procedure, I will first take a detour 
into the history of medical innovation and practice, with a special focus on 
the gains that doctors have achieved by systematically measuring the effects 
of potential treatments on health outcomes.  This discussion will have 
several payoffs for scholars of procedural reform.  First, the world of 
medieval medicine illustrates the dark side of relying on intuition and 
theory alone when evaluating how successful a treatment is.  In that time 
and place, doctors did an extraordinary amount of harm to patients, despite 
having good intentions, because it was impossible to assess whether a 
treatment was helping or hurting on a case-by-case basis.  This story has 
disturbing implications regarding the extent to which modern legal 
procedures achieve high levels of case accuracy, an outcome that goes 
similarly untested in our modern world.   
Next, I will describe how doctors were able to substantially improve the 
quality of patient care through a centuries-long effort to develop more 
accurate biological theories and to test the effect of possible treatments 
using controlled trials.  This example offers a potential source of inspiration 
to legal reformers.  Perhaps, if we were willing to invest resources on a 
similar scale with the goal of developing a measurably accurate procedural 
system, we could find similar success in improving the quality of justice. 
Finally, I will discuss modern methods of medical testing, with special 
emphasis on the FDA-mandated system of pharmaceutical drug testing and 
the recent reform efforts of the evidence-based medicine movement.  By 
surveying these modern approaches, we can find sources of guidance for 
how legal procedures could be similarly evaluated.  In particular, the 
evidence-based medicine movement has offered insights into the best 
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means of evaluating the efficacy of diagnostic tests, and this model 
provides a worthy example for procedural reformers to emulate.  We will 
also see, however, that implementing such procedures would require a 
willingness to invest sizeable amounts of time and money in improving the 
quality of justice, and that the approach can lose much of its value if it 
becomes politicized or captured by special interests.   
A. Medicine Before the Rise of Systematic Effectiveness Testing 
The phrase “evidence-based medicine” may be new,17 but people have 
long been interested in curing disease and increasing physical health.  
Although there are a few intriguing early examples of medical 
experiments,18 for a very long time medical practice doctors relied primarily 
on ancient authoritative texts and theoretical understandings of disease 
processes to choose treatments for the sick, supplemented by various forms 
of faith healing and folk medicine.19  Throughout much of Western history, 
medicine was a mixed bag; it offered some surprisingly effective treatments 
for a few conditions,20 but had little to offer for some of the most common 
medical challenges of the day, such as the often fatal process of childbirth, 
and favored the routine use of actively harmful procedures like bleeding 
and purging.21   
It would be a mistake to think that doctors relied on such methods 
because they were uninterested in curing patients.  Rather, they lacked the 
means by which to differentiate between good and bad treatments, and so 
tended to defer to ancient authorities to guide their decisions.22  In the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 17  See Claridge & Fabian, supra note 8, at 547 (tracing the origin of the term to the mid-1990s). 
 18  See, e.g., Daniel 1:1-16 (relating a dietary experiment proposed by Daniel and implemented by 
his guards); Christian Gluud et al., Commentary on the Ben Cao Tu Jing (Atlas of Materia Medica), 
JAMES LIND LIB. (2003), http://www.jameslindlibrary.org/illustrating/articles/commentary-on-the-ben-
cao-tu-jing-11th-century-atlas-of-mater.pdf.  Also notable among early medical practitioners were the 
Empiricists, a sect of ancient Greek physicians who eschewed the fanciful anatomical theories of the 
day, preferring to prescribe treatments by analogy to prior successful interventions rather than based on 
theoretic understandings of human disease processes.  See Vivian Nutton, The Rise of Medicine, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 53. 
 19  See generally Claridge & Fabian, supra note 8, at 547; Nutton, supra note 18, at 54–64 (relating 
how, for a long time after Galen, most medical writers devoted themselves primarily to collecting and 
restating past medical wisdom rather than challenging it).   
 20  See Nutton, supra note 18, at 66.  One historian lists medieval treatments for abdominal injuries, 
hernias, anal fistulae, bladder stones, and cataracts as particularly effective.  Id. 
 21  Id. at 68.   
 22  Perhaps the most influential authority was Galen of Pergamum, a Roman physician and 
philosopher who went to great lengths to synthesize the medical literatures of antiquity with his own 
investigations into anatomy, which he based primarily on dissections of pigs and monkeys.  Galen was 
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dominant paradigm, which dated back to Hippocrates, the body contained 
four “humors”—phlegm, red or yellow bile, black bile, and blood—and 
disease occurred when the balance between these humors was disturbed or 
when they were contaminated by toxins.23   
Many popular medical treatments attempted to balance the humors or 
rid the body of toxins by draining it of fluids that were believed to be 
contaminated.24  To accomplish this, physicians engaged in bloodletting, 
heaped blankets on feverish patients to make them sweat, gave them 
emetics to make them vomit, and purged their intestines with powerful 
laxatives.25  Even worse, the compounds used to open patients’ bowels were 
often highly toxic substances.26  Some herbal remedies were also employed 
to help balance the humors, but such remedies were mixed together in 
complex formulations so that the body could “select[] whatever ingredient 
would correct the humoral imbalance.”27  In short, in order to improve the 
health of their patients, doctors systematically made them “anaemic through 
bloodletting, deplet[ed them] . . . of fluids and valuable electrolytes via the 
stool, and poison[ed them] . . . with compounds of such heavy metals as 
mercury and lead.”28 
It is easy to look back on such a calamity and think that it must have 
been obvious that such procedures were a terrible idea, but it was not so.  In 
the world to which traditional medicine applied, many diseases were 
frequently fatal, with or without the addition of medical treatment.29  In any 
individual case, it would be impossible to tell whether a death occurred 
because of a heroic treatment or in spite of it.  Moreover, there were 
certainly many anecdotes that a doctor could point to in support of such 
theories.  Thanks to our immune systems, people often recover from disease 
and other calamities without medical intervention, and with a strong enough 
constitution recovery could no doubt follow even a stringent regime of 
                                                                                                                           
forced to rely on animal studies due to the Roman ban on the dissection of human cadavers.  The basic 
understanding of disease processes and therapeutic treatment he set out endured for millennia.  See id. at 
54–55; Roy Porter, What Is Disease?, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 80; 
Shorter, supra note 4, at 103.     
 23  See generally Shorter, supra note 4, at 103–04; Miles Weatherall, Drug Treatment and the Rise 
of Pharmacology, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 214. 
 24  See Shorter, supra note 4, at 104–05. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. at 108. 
 27  WALTER SNEADER, DRUG DISCOVERY: A HISTORY 22 (2005). 
 28  Shorter, supra note 4, at 109.  Given the content of traditional “heroic medicine,” it is perhaps 
unsurprising that some developed a dread of doctoring; indeed, Joseph Addison commented in 1711 that 
“when a nation abounds in physicians, it grows thin of people.”  Id. (quoting 1 THE SPECTATOR IN FOUR 
VOLUMES 64–65 (1945)). 
 29  See L. Cilliers, Where Were the Doctors When the Roman Empire Died?, 26 ACTA THEOLOGICA 
SUPPLEMENTUM 62, 75 (2006).  
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bleeding, blistering, and purging.30  And in some cases, these therapies may 
even have helped patients feel better, thanks to the power of the placebo 
effect.31  A patient’s belief that a particular cure will be beneficial can have 
therapeutic effects even where the treatment itself is biochemically useless, 
and many patients believed powerfully that traditional medicine could cure 
them.32  Indeed, some patients attributed their healing to truly awful medical 
interventions.33  So, despite its horrors, traditional medicine seemed 
plausible enough during the long stretch of history to which it applied, and 
continued to be demanded by patients even as doctors began to lose faith in 
it.34  The example of medieval medicine shows us that well-meaning 
professionals can do great harm to the people they are trying to help by 
depending on conventional wisdom and theories to choose their treatments 
if those theories do not rest on a firm and tested foundation.  This example 
should be sobering for those who would reform legal procedures, given that 
our existing procedural toolkit has been subject to only limited testing. 
B. Sowing the Seeds of Doubt 
Two early reformers, Paracelsus35 and Vesalius,36 took the first steps 
towards making medicine testable.37  Although he had many other odd 
notions, Paracelsus pioneered the idea of using purified, specific 
compounds as remedies rather than the complex blends of herbs known as 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 30  See DAVID L. SACKETT ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH 
EBM 150–51 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that when observing a single patient’s case, it can be difficult to 
distinguish true effects of treatment from natural healing processes or placebo effects). 
 31  See Porter, supra note 22, at 83. 
 32  See Shorter, supra note 4, at 104. 
 33  See id. at 105.  One particularly telling anecdote involves a German patient in the early 
nineteenth century who was “weak, losing weight, and unable to rise from bed.”  Id.  The doctor sent 
along a mild placebo of sweet syrup, but ants colonized the vial when the messenger took a rest break on 
his way to the house.  Id.  The peasant later received the doctor looking quite recovered, and credited his 
recovery to the powerful vomiting that the “really tough medicine” had induced.  Id.  
 34  Id. 
 35  See SNEADER, supra note 27, at 41.  Born in Switzerland in the late fifteenth century, Paracelsus 
attended medical school but came to reject the ancient approaches favored by doctors of his day.  Id.  He 
famously burned Galenic books, seeking instead to develop his own version of medical science; he 
studied folk remedies, conducted chemical experiments, and invented a variety of chemical and mineral 
cures.  Id.; Weatherall, supra note 23, at 213–14.  Some of his ideas were heavily influenced by alchemy 
and astrology, and some of his cures consisted of toxic doses of heavy metals, but he also managed to 
propose the idea that living beings require air to live and to introduce the use of laudanum, an opioid 
tincture, for the treatment of pain.  See SNEADER, supra, at 42; Weatherall, supra, at 213–14. 
 36  See generally Walter Pagel & Pyarali Rattansi, Vesalius and Paracelsus, in MEDICAL HISTORY 
309, 309–28 (F.N.L. Poynter ed., 1964) (discussing the life of Vesalius). 
 37  Id. at 320.   
34 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:25 
 
“galenicals.”38  Ultimately, this would enable physicians to measure the 
impact of specific pharmaceutical compounds on patient health.  Vesalius 
explored the details of human anatomy by means of extensive dissection of 
cadavers.39  He catalogued more than two hundred errors in Galen’s 
anatomical descriptions, including Galen’s claims that venous blood 
originated in the liver and his poor understanding of the movement of blood 
through the human heart and lungs.40  By both casting strong doubt on 
received authority regarding effective treatments and by proposing that 
“knowledge of the true anatomy . . . was only to be gained by dissection 
and close examination of the parts of the human body,” Vesalius and 
Paracelsus planted the seeds for an empirical and experimental turn in 
medicine.41 
Vesalius’s work inspired a close attention to anatomical detail that 
enabled many advances, as anatomists across Europe elaborated much that 
had been mysterious about the shape and functioning of the circulatory, 
pulmonary, digestive, nervous, and reproductive systems.42  A better 
understanding of the body’s mechanics made it increasingly hard to make 
sense of its functioning in terms of humoral balance.43  But to probe the 
body’s deeper biological secrets, a broader set of tools was needed.  Some 
researchers explored the realm of the very small, developing increasingly 
effective microscopes by which to elucidate the fine detail of living tissues, 
and eventually developing the cell model of biological systems and the 
roles of bacteria and parasites in causing diseases.44   
Other important techniques and inventions enabled clinicians to expand 
their observations into the interior of the body.  Doctors learned to listen to 
the inner workings of the body, first by percussing the chest to hear the 
special sounds of pulmonary disease, and later by employing the newly 
developed stethoscope to hear “the movement of blood, gas, and air within 
the limbs and major body cavities.”45  By the end of the 1800s, doctors were 
using X-ray technology to see what had previously been hidden behind the 
skin of their patients,46 and using sensors to monitor the electrical activity 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 38  Compare SNEADER, supra note 27, at 22, with Pagel & Rattansi, supra note 36, at 42. 
 39  See Pagel & Rattansi, supra note 36, at 319. 
 40  Id. at 318–19. 
 41  Id. at 325. 
 42  See SNEADER, supra note 27, at 74; Porter, supra note 22, at 138. 
 43  See Porter, supra note 22, at 138–39.   
 44  See id. at 141, 159–60.  See generally GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 286–88 
(1958).  
 45  Shorter, supra note 4, at 113.  See generally Porter, supra note 22, at 153. 
 46  Stanley Joel Reiser, The Science of Diagnosis: Diagnostic Technology, in 2 COMPANION 
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of the heart.47  These new disciplines, which incorporated knowledge drawn 
from physics and chemistry into the medical toolkit, enabled doctors to 
understand in far better detail the specific course of diseases in the body.   
But observation and theorizing alone probably could not have swept 
aside the practices of ancient medicine.  It was also necessary to show that 
the new theories could make a practical difference in treating patients.  
Unfortunately, for some time it was much easier to show what did not work 
than what did.  As the mathematics of statistical analysis was coming of age 
during the 1700s, doctors began to track the results of larger numbers of 
cases to evaluate potential therapies instead of relying on single case 
histories as their unit of analysis.48   Such methods soon showed the defects 
in common therapies.  In 1835, Pierre Louis published his Recherches sur 
les Effets de la Saigneé, which reported his comparisons of matched pairs of 
patients with similar histories and conditions, some of whom received 
traditional therapies like bloodletting and emetics, while others did not.49  
He found that traditional therapies offered little to no therapeutic benefit for 
patients suffering from pneumonia or other diseases.50  Increasingly, the old 
humoral ideas about treatment became increasingly unsupportable, as their 
theories could not be squared with internal anatomy and their treatment 
recommendations turned out to be ineffective when subjected to statistical 
analysis.   
C. Developing Scientifically Valid Foundations for Medical Practice 
Happily for us, the power of experimentation did more than just show 
us what not to do; when coupled with sustained inquiry and attempts to 
innovate new treatments, experimental methods allowed medicine to finally 
                                                                                                                           
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 826, 839–40 (W.F. Bynum & Roy Porter eds., 1993).  
The spread of this technology in particular was extraordinarily rapid.  Id. at 840.  One professor of 
surgery commented, just two years after the discovery of X-ray imaging, that “[p]roper surgery cannot 
be done in a certain variety of diseases without first using the X-ray.”  Id. at 840. 
 47  Roy Porter, Hospitals and Surgery, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 
208. 
 48  W.F. BYNUM, SCIENCE AND THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 42–44 
(1994).  In one early study, James Lind grouped together twelve scurvy patients in 1747 and compared 
the effects of six potential therapies, concluding that citrus fruit was the most effective in treating this 
disease, which was widespread among seamen.  Id. at 42–43; Claridge & Fabian, supra note 8, at 549.  
Lind and others encouraged the systematic reporting of case histories, so that similar analyses could be 
conducted with respect to other diseases, and hospitals increasingly complied.  BYNUM, supra, at 42–43.  
 49  See PIERRE LOUIS, RECHERCHES SUR LES EFFETS DE LA SAIGNEÉ 7 (1835). 
 50  BYNUM, supra note 48, at 43–44.  Louis’s decision to publish these results no doubt required a 
fair bit of bravery, given that his teacher, François Joseph Victor Broussais, was both a leader of the 
Paris school and a passionate advocate of “letting blood through leeching for virtually all diseases.”  Id. 
at 44; Harold J. Cook, Physical Methods, in 2 COMPANION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF 
MEDICINE, supra note 46, at 950.  
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start accumulating treatments that were known to be effective.  Even a 
summary of the major innovations in medicine would take far more space 
than a law article can afford, but a few highlights should help us recognize 
some of the ingredients that were crucial to the ultimate success of 
evidence-based medical treatment design.   
Some medical innovations turned out to be beneficial even though they 
were based on faulty biological theories.  One notable example is the 
asepsis revolution in surgery and wound care.51  For a long time, surgery 
was an extraordinarily risky proposition; patients risked succumbing to 
shock from the great pain involved, and wounds almost inevitably became 
infected, frequently leading to fatal sepsis.52  The identification and use of 
anesthetic agents helped to solve the first dilemma, while the second was 
much improved by attempts to improve hospital hygiene.53  Interestingly, 
however, reforms aimed at improving the sanitary conditions of hospitals 
significantly predated the microbiological theories that justify antiseptic 
methods for preventing infection.54  Rather, early reformers noted a 
connection between many diseases and the “filthy conditions and closed 
contaminated atmospheres” that prevailed not only in prisons and slums, 
but also within the hospitals of the period.55  This fell in line with a popular 
disease theory of the time, which held that the miasmatic gases one 
encountered in squalid conditions caused many diseases.56  Campaigns to 
make hospitals cleaner and better ventilated therefore predated the scientific 
understanding of bacterial infection by almost a hundred years.57 
Sometimes, in other words, one can stumble on efficacious ideas by 
accident. 58 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 51  ROSEN, supra note 44, at 315–16.   
 52  Id. at 315. 
 53  See id. at 317–19. 
 54  Id. at 319. 
 55  Dorothy Porter, Public Health, in 2 COMPANION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, 
supra note 46, at 1235–36; Porter, supra note 47, at 189. 
 56  Porter, supra note 55, at 1236. 
 57  Compare Porter, supra note 55, with ROSEN, supra note 44, at 319.  
 58  A similar example can be found in smallpox inoculation, an effective immunological program 
that predated an understanding of basic immunological concepts by nearly a century.  Early inoculation 
efforts took place in the mid-1700s, based on the observation that those who had previously survived the 
disease were resistant to new infections.  Before long, a less dangerous inoculation was made available 
by Edward Jenner, who observed that milkmaids who had been exposed to cowpox also developed a 
resistance to smallpox.  See Kenneth Kiple, The History of Disease, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 33.  The relationship between inoculation and the body’s production of 
antibodies was not understood until the late 1800s.  See generally Paul Weindling, The Immunological 
Tradition, in 1 COMPANION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 46, at 192–95.  
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More often, however, the identification of useful treatment methods 
will require both sustained development of underlying theories and the 
willingness to try many different means of achieving the desired result.  The 
history of antibiotic development, surely one of the greatest triumphs of the 
evidence revolution in medicine, provides an instructive example.  
Detecting bacteria and understanding how they were transmitted and how 
they led to diseases required an extensive research program.59  Important 
advances depended on Louis Pasteur’s work on the chemistry of optically 
asymmetric organic compounds, which enabled him to detect the existence 
of biological activity in the fermenting of beer and wine.60  This realization 
led to his subsequent studies of how such activity could be controlled and of 
how microbes can be transmitted through the air.61  The ultimate detection 
of many microbes depended on the development of special chemical dyes 
that could be used to stain and then visualize them using newly developed 
microscopes.62  Robert Koch’s studies of infected mice were later critical to 
establishing the life cycle of bacteria in a living host.63  Finally, the 
development of effective chemical antibiotics depended on a great deal of 
observational study of various conditions that inhibited bacterial growth, 
such as the proximity of certain fungi, as well as an exhaustive process of 
trial and error with a wide variety of chemical compounds.64  All in all, it 
was more than eighty years from the date Pasteur first discovered anaerobic 
bacteria until generally effective antibiotic treatments began to be available 
on the mass market in the late 1930s.65 
D. Evidence-Based Medicine in the Modern Age 
Despite the advances described above, many medical challenges persist.  
Cancers, cardiac ailments, and other diseases of the long-lived and well-
nourished remain to trouble the medical establishment, while the 
evolutionary process assures that some old diseases will occasionally 
become resistant to existing therapies and rise again to trouble us.66  By 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 59  See generally ROSEN, supra note 44, at 280–91. 
 60  Id. at 305–06. 
 61  Id. at 307. 
 62  Id. at 312–13. 
 63  Id. at 311–12. 
 64  See generally SNEADER, supra note 27, at 287–313.  See also WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at 
149–54, 170–82. 
 65  See generally Chronology, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 351–55. 
 66  See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-H-629, IMPACTS OF ANTIBIOTIC-
RESISTANT BACTERIA 1 (1995), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_1/DATA/1995/ 
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observing the struggles that medicine continues to face as well as its 
obvious achievements, we can learn much about what a similar movement 
in the legal world can expect.   
Several features of modern medical practice are particularly note-
worthy.  First, the search for new treatments involves inevitable tradeoffs 
between protecting the safety of existing patients and learning how to better 
treat future ones.67  Second, many effective therapies would never have 
come into existence absent the very costly searches and testing conducted 
by for-profit entities with financial incentives to investigate many possible 
therapies.68  Third, although attention to the minutiae of biological 
processes has brought many benefits, modern clinicians have recently made 
a strong case for experimental protocols that go beyond testing the effects 
of medicine on immediate biophysical markers by measuring medicine’s 
impact on overall health as well.69  This shift of attention from measuring 
surrogate outcomes to ultimate outcomes has allowed researchers to 
demonstrate that many popular treatments and diagnostic techniques 
actually do more harm than good.70  Finally, even in the modern age, 
medical investigation remains subject to bias arising from financial interest 
and skewed reporting of trial outcomes.71 
To begin with, let us consider the problem of identifying new effective 
therapies.  The history already discussed should indicate that this problem is 
far from trivial; as already mentioned, many decades passed between the 
seminal work identifying bacteria as the source of many diseases and the 
identification of effective antibiotic treatments for many common infectious 
diseases.  As a general matter, we cannot test or compare treatments until 
we have identified them as plausible candidates, and indeed the history of 
medical innovation is littered with useful inventions whose promise lay 
unrealized for some time.72 
So a central challenge of maximizing medical effectiveness is the high 
cost of finding new candidate treatments.  One of the reasons such costs can 
                                                                                                                           
9503.PDF.  
 67  John Barbour, The Century of Wonder Drugs/Antibiotics: Medical Savior for Millions/Advent of Sulfa 
and Penicillin Later Made Cardiac Surgery, Organ Transplants Possible, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 8, 1991, at A25, 
available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1991_827186/the-century-of-wonder-drugs-antib 
iotics-medical-sa.html. 
 68  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 2–3 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/ 
doc7615/10-02-drugr-d.pdf (noting that the cost of finding an innovative new drug in the modern 
regulatory environment exceeds $800 million per new molecular entity). 
 69  See generally Richard A. Deyo, Using Outcomes to Improve Quality of Research and Quality of 
Care, in EVIDENCE-BASED CLINICAL PRACTICE: CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES 65–66 (John P. Geyman 
et al. eds., 2000).  
 70  See id. 
 71  See id.  
 72  See Barbour, supra note 67.  
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be quite high is that the risks of employing the wrong treatments can be 
substantial.73  This can lead us to demand high standards of evidence of 
safety and efficacy before we will tolerate the use of a treatment.74  In 
modern medical history, this concern has manifested most notably in the 
area of pharmaceutical treatments.   
Although pharmaceuticals represent some of our greatest modern 
medical innovations, they also have enormous power to do harm.  Take the 
famous tragedy associated with a once popular sleeping tablet called 
thalidomide.  Developed by the German firm Chemie Grünenthal in the 
1950s, thalidomide showed enormous promise as a sleep aid,75 producing a 
“deep, natural, all-night sleep without a hangover.”76  Unlike most other 
sleeping pills of the time, it had low acute toxicity, meaning that there was a 
large difference between the dosage that would induce sleep and the dosage 
that would induce death.77  Once it was approved in many countries 
(although not yet in the United States), doctors began prescribing it for a 
wide range of conditions; it was used to treat “colds, coughs, influenza, 
nervousness, migraine and other headaches, . . . asthma,” and, most 
tragically, nausea.78  Unfortunately, thalidomide was a teratogen, capable of 
causing birth defects in developing fetuses if taken at very specific times 
during early pregnancy.79  Since pregnant women frequently used it to treat 
their nausea at night, many thousands of deformed infants were born across 
Europe before the drug’s teratogenic effect was understood.80   
The case of thalidomide illustrates well the challenges involved in 
making sure a new treatment is safe and effective.  The drug manufacturer 
had first tested thalidomide on mice, rats, guinea pigs, and rabbits, and it 
had observed no ill effects during those experiments.81  But this sort of 
investigation proved unable to detect warning signs about the drug’s 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 73  See generally Jonathan V. O’Steen & Van O’Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx and the Argument Against 
Federal Preemption of State Claims for Injuries Resulting from Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (2006).  
 74  See generally id. 
 75  SNEADER, supra note 27, at 367. 
 76  Max Sherman & Steven Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD DRUG 
COSM. L.J. 458, 460 (1986). 
 77  Carrie L. Radomsky & Norman Levine, Thalidomide, 19 DERMATOLOGIC CLINICS 87, 87 (2001). 
 78  Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 460. 
 79  See WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at 277. 
 80  Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 459.  The lag between the first birth defects and the 
discovery of thalidomide as the cause was exacerbated by Grünenthal’s attempts to conceal information 
regarding these birth defects from their potential customers.  See SNEADER, supra note 27, at 367; 
WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at 276. 
 81  SNEADER, supra note 27, at 367. 
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dangers.82  Many drugs operate similarly in humans and other animals, but 
thalidomide is an exception to this rule.83  It has no teratogenic effect on 
many non-human test subjects, so even if pregnant animals had been used 
as test subjects, the investigation might have missed the drug’s dangers.84   
The manufacturer also conducted human trials of the drug, observing no 
apparent ill effects during treatment.85  Better-conducted tests in human 
subjects might have raised warning signs, but without advance knowledge 
of what the drug’s dangers were, researchers were looking for the wrong 
things.  The drug did cause a “tingling neuritis” in some patients, indicating 
possible damage to peripheral nerves,86 which some astute observers 
(including FDA analysts) thought might indicate greater risks for gestating 
fetuses.87  But such effects were noticed only late in the drug’s history.88  
Researchers conducting early trials of the drug may have missed such signs 
because the primary dangers presented by most sedative compounds happen 
quickly in the form of overdoses.89  As a result, early test subjects would 
not necessarily have been monitored for the span of time needed to observe 
the neuropathic side effect, which only occurred after “long-term use.”90  
And although a controlled experiment involving pregnant women as 
subjects could have detected the teratogenicity, the narrow time window 
during which the drug could act as a teratogen during fetal development 
meant that a large number of pregnant women would have had to have been 
tested at varying phases of their pregnancies in order to create a high 
likelihood of detecting this dreadful side effect.91  As this example 
illustrates, assuring the safety and efficacy of new drugs is a very hard thing 
to do.  In order to catch all possible ways that a drug might be harmful, it 
must be tested for its effects on a variety of subpopulations, using realistic 
dosages and time-courses of treatment.   
The FDA, which can count its refusal to approve thalidomide for sale in 
the United States as one of its great victories, now structures its approval 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. 
 84  See WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at 277. 
 85  Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 460. 
 86  See The Thalidomide Disaster, TIME, Aug. 10, 1962. 
 87  Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 460–61; see also SNEADER, supra note 27, at 368. 
 88  See Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 460. 
 89  See id. at 459. 
 90  Id. at 461. 
 91  See WEATHERALL, supra note 6, at 277.  Disturbingly, it is unlikely that such a test would occur 
even today.  Our existing FDA approval process, which was developed in part to prevent another 
thalidomide scandal, bars pregnant women from acting as test subjects during new-drug development.  
Sherman & Strauss, supra note 76, at 464. 
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process for new drugs in a manner that aims to forestall similar occurrences.  
First, before it will permit any drug trials in human subjects, the FDA 
demands the submission of a wealth of data regarding a drug’s composition 
and how it is manufactured.92  The agency also requires “[a]dequate 
information about pharmacological and toxicological studies of the drug 
involving laboratory animals or in vitro,” of a quantity and quality 
sufficient to assure the agency that the drug is likely to be safe when tested 
on people.93  Then, a company must conduct multiple rounds of human 
trials designed to show that the drug is acceptably safe, to demonstrate that 
it is therapeutically effective, and to quantify the nature and extent of its 
side effects.94   
In deciding whether these trials have demonstrated that a drug is ready 
to be marketed, the FDA generally requires that the trials be designed in 
such a way as to credibly demonstrate the causal impact of the drug.95  
Thus, in order to meet the agency’s standards, tests must generally compare 
the drug’s effects with the effects of a placebo or of a competing therapy (if 
one exists), so that it can be made clear whether the drug improves on 
existing alternatives.96  Beyond this, the agency also expects that a portion 
of the drug trials involve random assignment of patients to treatment and 
control groups to avoid problems of selection bias and to make the 
treatment groups and control groups as nearly identical as possible.97  A 
selection bias would occur, for instance, if researchers consciously or 
unconsciously steered healthier patients towards the drug rather than a 
placebo, with the result that the treated group ended up healthier than the 
control group due to the selection effect rather than the treatment itself.98  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 92  See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2012). 
 93  Id. 
 94  See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2012). 
 95  See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2012). 
 96  Id.  
 97  Id.; see also SACKETT ET AL., supra note 30, at 106–07.  
 98  See JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN 
EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 12–15 (2009); SACKETT ET AL., supra note 30, at 106–07.  A classic example 
of the impact of selection bias was seen during World War II, when the British asked statistician 
Abraham Wald to recommend where they should add additional armor to their bombers.  See John D. 
Cook, Selection Bias and Bombers, ENDEAVOUR (Jan. 21, 2008), http://www.johndcook. 
com/blog/2008/01/21/selection-bias-and-bombers/.  Upon examining the planes in service, Wald 
recommended that additional plating be added only to those spots where he could observe no damage.  
Id.  The reason, as he explained, was a selection effect: the sample provided consisted only of those 
planes that were shot in non-critical locations, given that all the critically damaged planes would have 
failed to return.  Id.  Thus, each bullet hole indicated not a location where planes were in danger of being 
shot, but rather a location where they could survive being shot.  Id.  
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The agency also requires information showing which population subgroups 
the drug has been tested in.99  This testing helps to make clear whether the 
drug behaves differently (and perhaps dangerously or inefficaciously) when 
given to some subpopulations.100   
Finally, the agency advises researchers to devise procedures to 
“minimize bias on the part of the subjects, observers, and analysts of the 
data,” and mentions “blinding” as one means by which to do so.101  
Blinding is a classic means by which to avoid a variety of problems in the 
measurement of causal effects.102  Either test subjects alone can be blinded 
(“single-blinding”), or both subjects and researchers can be blinded 
(“double-blinding”), to whether the subjects involved are receiving a real 
treatment or only a placebo.103  If subjects are kept ignorant, this can both 
preserve the ability of placebos to produce a placebo effect (thus assuring 
that real effects can be distinguished from placebo effects) and also can 
ensure that subjects do not change their behavior based on inclusion in the 
placebo group in a way that might jeopardize the overall results (such as by 
seeking alternative treatment during the pendency of the study).104  Blinding 
researchers has many benefits as well.  Researchers who know which 
patients are being treated and which are not may consciously or 
unconsciously communicate that information to patients, or may engage in 
wishful thinking when measuring results, thus enlarging the treatment’s 
effect through biased measurement.105  A randomly assigned, placebo-
controlled, double-blinded study with a reasonably large sample size has 
enormous power to isolate real effects from false ones, and thus is 
commonly labeled as a “gold standard” for measuring clinical efficacy.106  
As such, it may provide valuable inspiration for better designed studies of 
the efficacy of legal procedures as well, as I shall discuss later. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 99  21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2012); see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: COLLECTION OF RACE AND ETHNICITY DATA IN CLINICAL TRIALS 
(2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126396.pdf. 
 100  See SACKETT ET AL., supra note 30, at 119 (noting that sociodemographic differences can 
occasionally make the results of prior trials inapplicable to a patient). 
 101  21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2012).  
 102  See Larry E. Miller & Morgan E. Stewart, The Blind Leading the Blind: Use and Misuse of 
Blinding in Randomized Controlled Trials, 32 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 240, 240 (2011).  
 103  David W. Peterson & John M. Conley, Of Cherries, Fudge, and Onions: Science and Its 
Courtroom Perversions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 217–18 (2001). 
 104  See id. 
 105  See generally Kenneth F. Schulz, Blinding in Randomized Trials: Hiding Who Got What, 359 LANCET 
696 (2002). 
 106  Ted J. Kaptchuk, The Double-Blind, Randomized, Placebo-Controlled Trial: Gold Standard or 
Golden Calf?, 54 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 541, 541 (2001). 
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The FDA, therefore, goes to great lengths to ensure that 
pharmaceuticals are safe and effective before they can be marketed to the 
general public.  All of this caution, unfortunately, has a downside.  Just one 
out of every 1,000 tested compounds shows enough promise to make it 
through pre-clinical testing (the in-vitro and animal-based studies that 
precede human subject testing), and just one in four drugs tested in human 
subjects survives the long gauntlet of FDA-mandated clinical trials.107  
Companies can generally expect an eight to twelve year process of testing a 
product and awaiting the FDA’s decision regarding its marketability,108 and 
they must spend hundreds of millions of dollars in research and testing 
costs for each new drug they wish to develop and sell.109  This means that 
although we can be confident that new drugs are an improvement over old 
ones, relatively few companies will be able to afford to engage in the 
extensive development process necessary to produce new drugs.110  Indeed, 
the FDA has increasingly come under fire in recent years for imposing so 
many hurdles in the path of drug developers.111  Some critics have 
successfully pressured it to reduce the amount of screening conducted for 
new drugs, even though such haste predictably results in more adverse drug 
reactions.112   
Unfortunately, we face an inevitable trade-off between producing and 
testing as many new treatment ideas as possible and protecting patient 
safety.  We could potentially find many more effective pharmaceuticals if 
we lowered the costs involved in trying out new drugs, but that would come 
at a human cost.  Given the uncertainty involved in trying to predict what 
we might discover if we looked harder and what value such discoveries 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 107  Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and 
Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 39 IOWA L. REV. 393, 417 (2007). 
 108  Mary K. Olson, Regulatory Agency Discretion Among Competing Industries: Inside the FDA, 11 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 379, 382 (1995) (describing a total time ranging from eight to twelve years for 
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 109  Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 
J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) (estimating an average out-of-pocket cost of $403 million per new 
drug, with a total capitalized cost of $802 million). 
 110  See Carrier, supra note 107, at 401 (noting that there are no longer any “garage inventors” 
producing new drugs and that the universe of potential drug innovators is now restricted to large, 
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 111  See Jeffrey S. Barkun et al., Evaluation and Stages of Surgical Innovations, 374 LANCET 1089, 1090 
(2009) (noting that the FDA’s mechanism has slowed drug development); Carrier, supra note 107, at 401, 417; 
Richard A. Epstein, The Pharmaceutical Industry at Risk: How Excessive Government Regulation Stifles 
Innovation, 82 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 131, 131–32 (2007). 
 112  See Barkun et al., supra note 111, at 1090 (noting that the FDA’s mechanism has slowed drug 
development). 
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could have for human health, such trade-offs will necessarily resist 
quantified analysis.  
It is interesting, nonetheless, to compare pharmaceutical development 
with other areas of medicine that the FDA does not regulate as heavily.  
New surgical procedures, for instance, do not fall within the FDA’s purview 
and are rarely subject to placebo-controlled trials on random subjects.113  
This difference cuts both ways: it is much easier to innovate new surgical 
techniques than it is to develop new drugs, but we have much less 
information regarding the typical safety of surgical interventions than we do 
of pharmacological ones.114  The downsides, when we become aware of 
them, can be large.  A recent, rare example of a blinded, placebo controlled, 
randomly assigned surgical trial addressed one of the most common types 
of orthopedic surgery: arthroscopic lavage of arthritic knees.115  When the 
investigators compared the operation with one in which patients received 
only skin incisions and anesthesia, but no surgery, it turned out that this 
operation, which was taking place more than 650,000 times per year, was 
no more effective than the placebo.116  Numerous patients, therefore, had 
been undertaking the risks of surgery for no real therapeutic benefit.117  
Whether more surgeries should be tested to the extent that most drugs are 
remains a question that deeply divides the medical profession,118 showing 
that the evidence-based revolution in medicine is still very much a work in 
progress. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 113  See Patrick L. Ergina et al., Challenges in Evaluating Surgical Innovation, 374 LANCET 1097, 
1097 (2009) (noting that RCTs have been rare in surgery since the 1970s). 
 114  See generally Barkun et al., supra note 111. 
 115  J. Bruce Moseley et al., A Controlled Trial of Arthroscopic Surgery for Osteoarthritis of the 
Knee, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 81, 81, 85 (2002). 
 116  Id. at 81, 84, 87. 
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 118  See Ergina et al., supra note 113, at 1097; Horng & Miller, supra note 117, at 137–39. 
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E. The Special Challenge of Validating Diagnostic Tests 
Between the extremes of high cost, high quality pharmaceutical design, 
and easy but potentially untrustworthy surgical innovation lies another 
target of the modern evidence-based medicine movement: diagnostic and 
screening tests, which are intended to detect whether patients harbor various 
hard-to-detect diseases.119  Over the last twenty years, reformers have 
increasingly argued that the decision to engage in diagnostic tests should 
depend on the existence of evidence that those tests actually benefit 
patients.120  Ideally, a diagnostic test would be risk-free, would be 
inexpensive to perform, and would have both perfect sensitivity, meaning 
that it generates no false positive results, as well as perfect specificity, 
meaning that it generates no false negatives.121  In the real world, this will 
rarely be the case.  Often the most accurate tests will be expensive or 
dangerous to a patient, and no test can ever be perfectly accurate.   
There will therefore always be a need among doctors for new tests that 
offer reasonably accurate results in a quick, cheap, and safe manner, as well 
as for experiments that can sort the useful tests from the bad.  Moreover, 
state-of-the-art methods of validating diagnostic tests have a unique 
relevance for designers of the rules governing the litigation process.  The 
litigation system itself can be conceived of as a special type of diagnostic 
test, designed to detect when a set of facts has occurred that gives rise to 
legal consequences.  Its methods and results may be different, but the goal 
of ensuring high sensitivity and specificity is the same. 
Special research designs are needed to validate diagnostic tests.  First, 
the general method for evaluating a test relies on comparing it with an 
existing “gold standard” of diagnosis.122  Such gold standards are those 
existing tests that maximize specificity and sensitivity to the greatest extent 
possible.123  Of course, both ethical and scientific constraints will make any 
gold standard chosen for research purposes a compromise.  Doctors cannot 
dissect the brains of healthy individuals to validate a test for brain cancer, 
and even if they did, the possibility of misclassification of results can never 
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 120  See, e.g., M. Carrington Reid et al., Use of Methodological Standards in Diagnostic Test 
Research Getting Better but Still Not Good, 274 JAMA 645, 645–50 (1995). 
 121  Joann G. Elmore & Edward J. Boyko, Assessing Accuracy of Diagnostic and Screening Tests, in 
EVIDENCE-BASED CLINICAL PRACTICE: CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES, supra note 69, at 83, 85.  
 122  Id. at 85–87; see also SHARON E. STRAUS ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO 
PRACTICE AND TEACH EBM 71–72 (3d ed. 2005). 
 123  Elmore & Boyko, supra note 121, at 85. 
46 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:25 
 
be entirely ruled out.124  Still, the idea of a gold standard provides an ideal 
towards which research designs can aspire; the more accurate the basis of 
comparison, the more confidence we can have that a study of a diagnostic 
test accurately represents its true performance.125   
Second, due to concerns regarding measurement bias, blinding is still a 
valuable principle in tests evaluating diagnostic procedures.126  Many test 
results involve significant amounts of interpretation, and the validity of an 
assessment of diagnostic validity may be compromised if researchers are 
influenced in their interpretation of that ambiguity by the result of another 
test.127  Thus, for instance, a radiologist interpreting an ambiguous chest X-
ray might be more likely to conclude that it shows evidence of a tumor if 
she knows that a lung biopsy has indicated that cancer is likely.128  To avoid 
this problem, it is ideal to have different individuals perform the test being 
assessed and the gold standard to which it is compared, and to keep them 
unaware of the other’s conclusions.129 
Third, if one wishes to get an accurate estimate of a test’s validity, it is 
important to design the coverage of the test cases to resemble how the test 
will be used in the real world.  Ideally, test subjects would be drawn 
randomly from the pool of people to whom the test might be applied under 
real world conditions, and then each would receive both the test under study 
and its gold standard comparison.130  If researchers pick and choose the 
cases that will be studied, bias can result.   
Finally, the best studies of screening and diagnostic tests will go 
beyond just measuring the tests’ accuracy; they will also assess the extent 
to which the information gained tends to come at an unacceptable risk to the 
patient’s safety and well-being.131  Just knowing the rates at which tests 
produce false positives and negatives is not enough.  A good study will 
track the real world consequences of such misestimates on patient health 
and well-being.  Some false positives, for instance, may lead to painful or 
dangerous biopsies, while others will be less costly.  Some false negatives 
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may be fatal, while others will be correctible at little long-term risk to the 
patient.  By comparing measures of long-term health when the test is or is 
not used, researchers can offer some guidance as to whether its accuracy 
comes at an unacceptable price.  In particular, if a test increases knowledge 
but generally makes patients less well, it should be avoided. 
This distinction between what helps in the short term and what 
produces good long-term outcomes is one that modern proponents of 
evidence-based medicine emphasize.  In general, the reformers urge, the 
best evidence regarding the quality of medical treatments or tests tracks 
“ultimate outcomes of interest,” like overall patient mortality, morbidity, or 
pain levels, rather than “surrogate outcomes” in the form of discrete 
physiologic phenomena.132  This is a shift from the approach that long 
predominated, in which physicians focused their efforts on changing easily 
measureable surrogate outcomes.133   
As an example, a physician interested in preventing future heart attacks 
in a patient with high cholesterol might wish to examine the efficacy of 
prescribing a medicine that lowers cholesterol.  A study using a surrogate 
outcome might rely on blood cholesterol levels to demonstrate the drug’s 
impact, while one focusing on ultimate outcomes might look at the effect of 
the drug on overall mortality.134  In some cases, the difference would be 
quite significant; some drugs, for instance, will lower cholesterol while 
increasing overall mortality.135  Such cures are truly worse than the disease, 
and provide an important cautionary tale about overreliance on theoretical 
understandings of complex systems.  As one doctor explains, “Recognition 
is growing that physiologic, laboratory, and imaging outcomes are 
sometimes poorly associated with symptomatic, functional, and survival 
outcomes.”136  For this reason, there is much value in tracking not just those 
changes in biological processes that are expected to improve a patient’s 
quality of life, but also more direct measures of quality of life such as 
survey responses.137  By doing so, clinicians can notice when their 
theoretical assumptions no longer guide the way towards improving patient 
well-being. 
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One last note of caution is in order regarding the value of evidence-
driven design of medical treatments.  Those who innovate medical 
treatments often stand to gain a great deal of profit from them,138 and even 
when treatments are developed in an academic setting, there may be 
incentives to advance an individual researcher’s career at the expense of 
promoting accurate knowledge regarding effective treatments.139  These 
factors can lead to “publication bias,” in which trials favoring the safety and 
efficacy of drugs are published while those that cast doubt on efficacy are 
suppressed.140  The medical establishment has taken some steps to rein in 
the biasing effects of having trials funded by those who look to profit from 
selling a treatment through disclosure rules, but such rules have proven 
challenging to enforce.141  What is more, even government oversight may 
not always be sufficient to incentivize adequate investigation into the 
potential risks of highly profitable treatments.142  Thus, in addition to the 
challenges described above, the development of an evidence-based culture 
faces an additional roadblock in the form of profit incentives that may 
inhibit the willingness of manufacturers to investigate and publicize 
evidence that blockbuster drugs are dangerous or ineffective. 
Still, despite these challenges, an evidence-based approach to medical 
testing and treatments has gone a long way towards improving the quality 
of medical care over the long term.  What is more, the existence of a culture 
that regularly performs such testing provides us with an important basis for 
trusting the efficacy of medical treatments as a general matter.  Still, as we 
have seen, the dialogue is still ongoing within the medical community 
regarding how stringent such testing should be.  There are costs and dangers 
associated with either too much or too little testing before treatments are put 
into general use.   
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III. WHY PROCEDURAL DESIGNERS NEED BETTER DATA 
The lessons of evidence-based medicine reform may be good or bad 
news, depending on how we look at them.  The turn towards systematic 
measurement of treatment efficacy, coupled with a detailed investigation 
into the causes of disease, has enabled medicine to grow vastly more 
effective and safe than it once was.143  Since we do not, in general, subject 
most new procedural devices to similar scrutiny, this suggests that there is a 
great deal of available low-hanging fruit in the form of improvements to 
procedural design that could be obtained just by looking carefully at which 
existing devices work well and which do not.144  At the same time, doctors 
are still wrestling to consistently apply evidence-based criteria to their 
decision making, and many complain that the costs of requiring careful 
investigations might retard the creativity needed to locate the next 
generation of novel therapies.145  This suggests that the road towards 
systematically testing procedural efficacy may be quite challenging and 
costly if we wish to do it right. 
Why, then, should we bear these burdens?  This Section will illustrate 
some of the challenges that arise for those who would design rules of 
procedure or evidence without drawing on data from controlled procedural 
trials, and also why such trials are hard to do well.  It turns out that intuition 
and anecdotal experience are likely to be poor guides towards procedural 
success.146  What is more, most existing attempts to assess procedural 
efficacy using statistical analysis of observational data fall short because 
their methods are unlikely to yield trustworthy conclusions about the causal 
impact of different rules.147  We might solve many of these problems by 
running controlled experiments that compare the impacts of different 
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procedural and evidential rule regimes,148 but the vast and interconnected 
nature of judicial institutions will make such experiments hard to do and 
will mean that some important questions may lie beyond our ability to 
measure.    
When deciding whether to adopt a new rule of procedure or evidence, 
rule makers typically seek to optimize a few variables.149  They would like 
to make rules that achieve good outcomes, that do not create excessive costs 
for the litigants or the justice system, and that do not protract litigation for 
no benefit.150  To achieve meaningful procedural improvements, they have 
to evaluate a complicated question: Would the litigation system, over time, 
strike a better balance among these values via the implementation of a new 
rule, or would it be better to continue using an existing one?  This question 
is partly normative, given that there will always be value-driven 
disagreements regarding the appropriate balance between the differing 
values.  No one can claim to have an objective basis, for instance, on which 
to decide how much we should spend to achieve a given increment of 
accuracy.  Rather, the appropriate balance will always depend on the 
comparative importance one attaches to each factor.  But there is also an 
objective component to such an inquiry: In a given set of cases, two 
different rule regimes, if implemented, might produce a different balance of 
accuracy in results, perceived fairness, time-to-case-completion, overall 
cost, and cost distribution.  So in deciding what procedures we should adopt 
for settling disputes, we combine two main inputs: a set of normative 
preferences regarding the ideal balance between factors like accuracy, 
perceived fairness, and costs, and a set of factual judgments regarding how 
the competing rule alternatives would impact those factors. 
A. The Challenges of Designing New Procedural Rules 
For a variety of reasons, anticipating the impact of a proposed rule on 
these values is very hard to do.  First, each legal case will be different, and 
may respond differently to the new rule.  Here there is a strong analogy 
with medical research: Just as each individual has a unique medical history 
and constellation of symptoms, so each case involves a new combination of 
facts, legal rules, parties, lawyers, and judicial staff.  Just as we cannot 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 148  See generally id. at 67–68. 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 130 (2010).    
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know how safe drugs are in general by seeing how they behave in a small 
group of patients, we cannot easily estimate the impact of a rule by seeing 
how it operates in a few cases.151  Doing so risks the legal equivalent of the 
thalidomide crisis.152  There, initial testing failed to include pregnant 
women, and thus failed to catch the drug’s dangerous side effects for 
developing fetuses.153  In legal contexts, we might expect similar results, 
because a rule applied to good effect in one sort of setting may have more 
negative impacts if applied in new arenas. 
Historically, it is easy to identify occasions when procedural rule 
makers made this mistake.  Perhaps the most notable recent instance 
occurred during the enactment of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in 1937.  Reformers such as Charles Clark desired to make litigation faster 
and more efficient.154  They noted that a relatively new procedural device, 
the motion for summary judgment, had advanced these ends in English 
practice.155  In this early version of summary judgment, a plaintiff seeking 
liquidated damages could obtain speedy justice by filing an affidavit 
showing that there were no factual disputes necessitating a jury trial.156  If 
the defendant failed to file a counter-affidavit showing that a factual dispute 
in fact existed, a court could then allow the plaintiff to recover damages 
without going through the formalities of a jury trial.157   
Seeing the success of summary judgment in this narrow context, the 
drafters urged that the new rules should incorporate a similar provision that 
could be used in all types of cases, whether or not liquidated damages were 
involved, and that could be sought by either plaintiffs or defendants.158  The 
enactors of the new Federal Rules obliged.159   
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Unfortunately, the birth of this rule provides a classic example of how a 
rule can behave differently than expected when used in new ways and in 
new types of cases.  Although a broader version of summary judgment, 
similar to the new federal experiment, had been tried in Michigan, the 
drafters of the new rule did not collect any data regarding its performance 
before copying it on a much larger scale.160  Rather, they relied on their 
intuitive understanding of the judicial process and their imaginations to 
predict its future performance.  They expected that the rule would primarily 
be used by plaintiffs to “pierce assumed or fictitious defenses,”161 but 
instead the rule is now primarily employed by defendants who claim that 
plaintiffs have not collected enough evidence to prevail at trial.162  What is 
worse, many observers believe that summary judgment, used in this 
unforeseen way, multiplies legal costs rather than reducing them (although, 
as we shall see, this is a very hard thing to show empirically).163  
Why did our reformers not see this coming?  It is not because they were 
uninterested in collecting data—Clark, in particular, was a major proponent 
of amassing descriptive statistics on the operation of law in action in 
everyday cases.164  Rather, it seems that when they imagined expanded use 
of the device, they failed to anticipate how differing circumstances might 
impact its workings.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys, especially those paid on 
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contingency, have little incentive to employ stalling tactics, but defendants 
and their attorneys can sometimes benefit by using summary judgment as a 
means of delaying cases and raising costs for plaintiffs.165  Particularly in 
high-stakes cases, defendants will have much to win, and little to lose, by 
seeking summary judgment.  So instead of being used in rare cases166 as “a 
simple and quick way of disposing of routine . . . cases of debts or 
liquidated demands,” as Clark expected,167 litigants now routinely move for 
summary judgment in large and complicated cases where its efficiency-
promoting value is less clear.168 
Of course, none of this happened overnight, and there were many steps 
along the way that helped usher in the modern use of summary judgment.  
Some courts, including the Third Circuit, initially attempted to resist the 
movement towards defensive use of summary judgment by allowing 
plaintiffs to point to their pleadings as evidence of material fact disputes, 
but the Rules Committee amended the rule to make it clear that this was not 
appropriate.169  The “basic purpose” of summary judgment, they explained, 
was to “assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 
trial.”170  Two decades later, in the group of cases that have become known 
as the summary judgment “trilogy,”171 the Supreme Court gave its blessing 
to the widespread use of summary judgment as a defensive device.  Celotex 
was particularly important in this regard: noting its view that summary 
judgment should be viewed as an “integral part of the Federal Rules” rather 
than a “disfavored procedural shortcut,” the Court held that defendants 
should be able to obtain summary judgment so long as they could show an 
absence of evidence favoring the plaintiff’s claim; counter-evidence 
disproving the claim would not be necessary.172  Perhaps these 
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consolidating amendments and interpretations of the rule could be viewed, 
to a greater extent than the rule’s original drafting, as effectively pursuing a 
goal of enabling widespread use of summary judgment by defendants.  But 
the basic point remains: it was not long after summary judgment had been 
promulgated before it started to be used in a way that the original rule 
drafters never anticipated.  And perhaps these subsequent ratifications and 
expansions would never have seemed like a worthy idea if not for the 
gradual spread of the defensive use of the device from non-existent, to an 
occasional rarity, into a method of case management that eclipsed trials on 
the merits.  Thus, modern judges, lawyers, and litigants might be likened to 
the frog that, in the old tale, never realized that a pot of water in which he 
was swimming was slowing rising to a boil until it was too late; we have, 
by slow and steady pressure from the defense bar, become inured to a 
procedure that we might not have elected had we been offered a clear 
choice at the outset, at least in the absence of evidence that it saves either 
time or money in the aggregate.  And given that other rules most likely 
undergo similar evolution over time, this might give us reason to doubt that 
our procedures, on average, strike an optimal balance between their costs 
and their benefits. 
The remedy for such mismatches between expected and actual rule 
functioning might seem clear: give rules a limited trial run before 
implementing them on a wide scale.173  Unfortunately, rules in practice may 
end up working very differently over the long term than they do during such 
trials.  Summary judgment continues to provide an instructive example.  
The drafters of Rule 56 might have looked to Michigan’s experience with a 
very similar rule in order to gauge its likely utility, but although this might 
have helped a bit, they still would have had a drastically limited picture of 
how it would operate over the long term in federal litigation.  Part of the 
problem was that the rule designers sought to make many reforms to federal 
civil litigation simultaneously.174  They thus did far more than just expand 
summary judgment; they also merged legal and equitable cases, enacted a 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 173  Several commentators have made proposals along these lines.  Some have urged a process of 
formal and rigorous experimentation with new rules.  See, e.g., Posner, supra note 144, at 366–68; Walker, 
supra note 144, at 67–68.  Others have promoted the use of local informal “experiments” with rules even 
in the absence of randomized testing.  See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 144, at 1799; Tobias, supra note 144, at 
1324–28.  At one point in the early 1990s, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee briefly considered 
amending the rules to facilitate such informal experimentation, although the Standing Committee tabled 
this idea.  Tobias, supra, at 1324. 
 174  See Subrin, supra note 166, at 922–25. 
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plaintiff-friendly notice-pleading regime, and made a broad array of 
discovery available to litigating parties.175    
The adoption and expansion of civil discovery, in particular, critically 
changed the dynamics of the summary judgment device.  Discovery and 
factual investigation, taken together, are now the most time-consuming 
tasks that litigators face,176 and an increasingly large volume of this time 
and expense is devoted to preparing elaborate records for supporting and 
defending summary judgment motions.177  When the drafters envisioned the 
costs of moving for summary judgment, they imagined an affidavit-driven 
practice, but courts and rule makers, desiring to make the process as fair 
and accurate as possible, have invited litigants to take extensive oral 
depositions, introduce interrogatory answers, and amass large quantities of 
requested documents.178  Preparing this, and reviewing it, takes a great deal 
of time, and—given the rarity of trials—it is quite possible that the time and 
expense we save by granting summary judgment motions in some cases is 
outweighed by the time and expense we lose preparing for, reviewing, and 
deciding summary judgment motions.   
B. The Challenges of Detecting Procedural Effects Using Observational 
Data 
Summary judgment, then, provides an object lesson in the difficulty of 
designing new procedural rules: our instincts about how litigators will 
employ such rules may be misguided, and even observing how the rule has 
worked in practice may be unilluminating, given that future use may 
juxtapose one new rule with others and that the interaction among rules 
may be unpredictable.  Indeed, even though modern scholars have gone to 
great lengths to gather and evaluate observational data,179 we still know 
very little regarding the question we started with: Does the availability of 
summary judgment increase the overall efficiency of litigation?   
The basic problem we face is that the answer to this question is 
counterfactual.  No matter how many times we count how often such 
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motions are brought, how often they succeed, or how expensive they are, 
we will not be able to determine how the same cases would have proceeded 
if summary judgment was not available.  Nor will it do to compare cases in 
which such motions are brought with those in which they are not.  Lawyers 
do not decide whether or not to make a summary judgment motion at 
random, so comparing the two groups of the cases will draw on biased 
samples and produce data that is unilluminating.180  And we cannot 
compare cases decided before and after the new rule was implemented 
(even if we had easy access to good data from that period, which we do 
not), because we will not be able to tell whether any changes were wrought 
by the addition of summary judgment or by one of the many other changes 
to federal procedure that the new rules introduced.181  A more promising 
answer would be to compare similar cases brought in two jurisdictions that 
were as similar as possible except that one lacked summary judgment.  
Locating such a perfect comparison, however, may prove frustrating, given 
the wide adoption of summary judgment in United States jurisdictions and 
the numerous dissimilarities one would encounter if one tried to draw on 
foreign examples. 
These problems can be seen more clearly if we shift to an example that 
has sparked much more recent debate: the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
recent pleading cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly182 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal.183  Courts had long interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 to 
require relatively modest “notice” pleading, but in these two decisions the 
Supreme Court instructed that plaintiffs must also provide sufficient detail 
to make their claims “plausible.”184  Most scholars agree that this new 
wording raised the bar by which lower courts evaluate the sufficiency of 
civil complaints, which in theory should make it harder for plaintiffs to 
press their claims.185  But not all agree,186 and rule makers are waiting to see 
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evidence that these decisions are impacting dismissal practice before they 
consider whether the “new” rule should be returned to its former state.187 
A number of studies have attempted to detect whether Twombly and 
Iqbal have made it harder for plaintiffs with valid claims to be heard by the 
courts.188  Although these efforts are well-meaning and have involved 
substantial effort, they are instructive more for their shortcomings than their 
successes.  In the first place, it is remarkably hard to get systematic data 
about what courts do.  Most of the studies, in an attempt to save money and 
time, cull case data from legal search engines like Westlaw, even though 
most agree that this represents a biased sample of cases and almost surely 
overcounts grants of dismissals as compared with denials.189  So far, one 
group of researchers has gotten fuller access to court data while conducting 
research for the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”), and has used electronic 
docket data in order to get a broader picture of the grant rate for motions to 
dismiss.190  Drawing on a large sample of cases, the FJC study authors 
compared case activity in 2006 (before Twombly was decided) and 2010 (a 
year after Iqbal was decided).191  They reported that more motions to 
dismiss were filed in 2010 than in 2006, both on an absolute and on a 
percentage basis.192  They also showed that courts more readily granted 
motions to dismiss “with leave to amend” in the later year, but that courts 
were not more likely to grant such motions “without leave to amend,” 
which would indicate that the plaintiff was being finally thrown out of 
court.193  They then explained that although the increase in “without leave 
to amend” dismissals was accompanied by a slight rise in case terminations 
soon after those orders, those increases were small enough that they could 
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plausibly be the result of random variation between the two years.194  
Finally, they demonstrated that if one creates a statistical model that 
controls for a few factors195 unrelated to the Supreme Court’s decisions, the 
rise in “without leave to amend” grants disappears except in “financial 
instrument” cases, a category in which there has been a surge of litigation 
arising out of the economic downturn of 2008 and which plausibly might be 
dismissed at a higher rate due to the novel theories such cases often 
incorporate.196  
But although this data is helpful in giving us some sense of how 
Twombly and Iqbal have affected civil case processing, it still leaves many 
of the most important questions unanswered.  For one thing, the study is 
limited to looking at those claims that were actually filed, which means it 
cannot detect the degree to which plaintiffs with valid claims are deterred 
from filing lawsuits.197  Given that one would expect rational plaintiffs to 
take into account the likelihood of losing a motion to dismiss in their 
calculations when deciding whether or not to sue, this means that this study 
may substantially undercount the harm that the new pleading rule does to 
some deserving plaintiffs.   
On the flip side, of course, the study has no way of assessing the merit 
of dismissed claims.198  Perhaps the increase in motions filed and granted is 
due to a rise in dubious filings over the last few years (perhaps in the 
recently swollen “financial instrument” category, which courts are able to 
screen out using dismissal orders).  If that were the reason for the rise in 
dismissals, it would make a poor case for reform efforts.  But it is equally 
possible that the new filings are in fact better than average, but that courts 
nevertheless abuse their authority under Twombly and Iqbal to disfavor 
novel claims.  The basic problem is that, without a measure of the changing 
validity of complaints over time, any attempt to infer that Twombly and 
Iqbal have had either a beneficial or a negative impact based on grant rates 
alone misses the point.  Even if other authors are correct that grant rates are 
increasing for reasons unrelated to changing filing patterns,199 this could be 
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a sign that the new approach is succeeding, if there has been an uptick in 
frivolous filing.  Conversely, even if dismissals are holding steady or even 
declining, this might be masking a real impact, if the average validity of 
complaints was rising.   
Ultimately, however, there is a deeper problem with observational 
studies of this design: the dubiousness of inferring causal impact based on 
snapshots of litigation activity before and after a rule’s enactment.  In some 
areas, estimating causation based on before-and-after measurements can be 
a reasonably valid approach.200  But when dealing with new rules of 
procedure or evidence, we should place low confidence in conclusions 
driven by such reasoning.  Such research designs are subject to a dilemma.  
If we measure very soon before and after a new rule comes into effect, we 
may be reasonably confident that any before-and-after differences are due 
to the new rule.201  But, as the authors of the FJC study explain, legal rules 
take time to percolate before arriving in a longer-term equilibrium form.202  
Lower court judges may disagree about how to apply a new rule, appellate 
courts may reshape the rule through interpretation, and lawyers may 
develop new tactics that change how the rule works in practice.  The 
clearest example of why short-term measurement is a risky approach is 
summary judgment; for decades after the enactment of that device, it was 
used quite cautiously,203 but over time it became increasingly attractive to 
federal judges facing rising docket pressures and perceiving an excess of 
frivolous litigation.204  A study examining the few years after its enactment 
would have failed, therefore, to appreciate its likely long-term impact.  
Similarly, it may turn out that lawyers with good claims are almost always 
able to find the facts they need to satisfy a plausibility inquiry, but that it 
will take time for them to learn how.  In that case, any initial impact of the 
new regime on meritorious plaintiffs may evaporate over the longer term, 
and a short-term study would badly overstate the new rules’ demerits. 
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Unfortunately, the other horn of the dilemma is equally troubling.  If we 
lengthen our before-and-after period to try and wait for a real rule-
application equilibrium to arise, it becomes increasingly likely that other 
changes in the legal system’s operation will make it hard to isolate the 
causal effect of a rule change.  Take the FJC study as an example: even 
though the authors wait only a year after the second of the two cases that 
propound the new pleading regime, they already report a significant rise in 
federal court caseloads and a shift in the types of cases being brought.205  It 
may be possible to credibly control for such changes using statistical 
methods,206 but such modeling can only correct for changes that researchers 
can anticipate and measure.  Many other aspects of litigation relevant to 
motion-to-dismiss practice might be occurring, from changes in lawyering 
tactics or changes in the overall economic climate to changes in the makeup 
and ideology of the federal bench, any of which might affect pleading 
practice.  The longer we wait, the surer we can be that we have not 
anticipated or measured all the relevant factors.  In short, whether we 
engage in short-term or long-term before-and-after observation of rule 
impacts, we will always face significant unknowns regarding the true 
impact of new rules.207 
It is, of course, theoretically possible that our intuition and ratiocination 
can succeed where our attempts at explicit measurement cannot.  Maybe, in 
other words, we should not worry about defects in our ability to measure 
the impact of rules so long as the results of questionable research designs 
accord with what procedural scholars expect.  After all, people were 
throwing and catching balls long before Isaac Newton provided a 
formalized understanding of gravity.  Perhaps judges and lawyers, after 
enough immersion in the legal system, develop an intuitive understanding 
of litigation that rivals our in-built facility for predicting the movement of 
physical objects in space.208  If that was the case, an evidence-based 
movement might actually do more harm than good by causing us to throw 
out our theoretic judgments based on (as we have seen) the questionably 
valid data we normally can gather regarding procedural questions. 
Unfortunately, this theoretical possibility is almost certainly not a 
reality, no matter how much confidence individual lawyers and judges have 
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in their ability to say which new rules would work well and which poorly.  
For one thing, internal confidence is a poor guide to such accuracy.  The 
ball thrower knows, with practice, that he can hit a target, but he knows this 
because regular, clear feedback is easy to get in such an environment.  By 
contrast, it is hard to say for sure whether a new rule is improving legal 
practice or not; “success” is described as an optimal trade-off among 
competing values, and no one occupies an omniscient perspective from 
which all costs and benefits can be assessed.  Our position is much more 
like the sixteenth century doctor than the baseball player.  We know we 
want to resolve cases quickly, cheaply, and correctly, just as the doctor 
knew he wanted to make sick people better, but any one outcome could be 
the result of our new intervention or something else entirely.  Just as it was 
hard to evaluate the success of bloodletting by evaluating cases one at a 
time, so it is hard to evaluate the effect of a rule providing for sanctions for 
discovery misconduct just by reading cases that employ it. 
C. Building on the Medical Example: Using Randomized Controlled Trials 
of New Rules of Procedure 
Perhaps, however, the medical analogy can do more than help us define 
the limits to our present knowledge.  Can the recent rise of evidence-based 
medicine teach us more sophisticated ways to evaluate procedural success?  
Perhaps it can.  One of the greatest tools in the rise of scientific medicine 
has been the randomized controlled trial.209  Such trials represent a gold 
standard method of assessing causation because they isolate the impact of a 
single factor’s presence or absence in a comparison between two groups 
that are as close to identical as is possible.210  If we wish to have greater 
confidence that new rules actually provide a significant benefit over the 
status quo, randomizing rule application so that some litigants will be 
randomly assigned the new rule, while others the old one, has the potential 
to isolate the causal effect of the new rule.  What is more, such a trial could 
be run for long enough that litigators and judges in a particular area develop 
enough experience using the new rule to provide an indication of what a 
“mature” version of such a rule-in-action will be.   
This proposal has strong intuitive appeal, and a number of scholars 
have made proposals along these lines over the years.211  On a few 
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occasions, courts and scholars have dipped their toes into these waters, 
testing out new procedural rule proposals using randomized experiments.212  
Despite the promise of such an idea, however, we must be realistic about 
what would be involved in attempting to improve our litigation system 
through systematic testing of this nature.  The history of medicine shows 
that although some effective therapies can be found by a brief bit of 
experimental testing,213 there was a long period during which 
experimentation served primarily to show doctors what failed to help 
without providing much guidance as to what could do better.214  Two 
transformations were necessary before we could develop high confidence in 
medical therapies (and in some areas of medicine, these two 
transformations may still be works in progress).   
First, it was necessary to test many alternative models of how the body 
worked in order to develop an accurate understanding of the underlying 
biology of bodies and their diseases.215  Here, legal scholars may start with 
an advantage, as we will not need to invent microscopes in order to develop 
plausible theories of “lawsuit physiology.”  Rather, once initial 
confidentiality challenges are overcome, the relevant players can be 
interviewed and a large amount of data about the internal workings of cases 
can be collected at comparatively low cost.   
But the other transformation—conducting sufficient experimentation to 
locate the best possible rule configurations216—may prove more 
challenging. In order to find effective therapies, it is also necessary to try 
many things that will fail in order to identify those few things that reliably 
succeed.217  Such an undertaking may test our mettle.  First, we will have to 
develop a willingness to do far more procedural experimentation than has 
historically been the norm.  Second, we will be challenged by the fact that 
we have far fewer courts than human beings.  Trying to run multiple trials 
in the same court at one time may risk interaction effects between new rules 
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that we cannot reliably untangle through analysis.  So there would be 
challenges involved in setting appropriate research priorities and allocating 
courts to different rule-trials.218  In the end, it seems doubtful that we will 
identify many optimal procedural choices through the sort of sporadic, ad 
hoc experimentation that has been typical of the last few decades. 
I will not belabor the value of randomized trials as compared with 
observational studies.  Others have made that argument better than I can, 
and in any event it may be possible to approximate many of the benefits of 
randomized experiments through increasingly thoughtful design of 
observational studies.  There is one final challenge involved in creating an 
evidence-based procedural reform movement that has no parallel in 
medicine, however, and which will inevitably plague attempts to make 
evidence relevant to procedural design whether we conduct experiments or 
count case outcomes.   
As discussed above, doctors have sometimes disagreed about whether 
to measure objective immediate indicators of health or more ultimate, but 
subjective, qualitative information.219  Procedural reform, however, will 
involve a much thornier challenge.  Simply put, some of the outcome 
variables of greatest interest to procedural reformers go unmeasured in 
nearly all empirical investigations of procedural effects, even those 
observational or experimental studies that approach most closely a gold 
standard ideal.  In particular, one of the key goals of procedure is to achieve 
“just” or “accurate” outcomes in individual cases, but almost no studies 
attempt to measure accuracy.  The next few sections of this Article will 
discuss the severity of this problem and how it might be addressed through 
novel research designs. 
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF MEASURING ACCURACY WHEN EVALUATING 
PROCEDURAL RULES 
As we have discussed, rules of procedure are hard to design, both 
because rules behave unpredictably and because it is hard to detect the true 
impact of the rules governing the litigation system.  Perhaps, then, rule 
makers should imitate those who promote evidence-based decision making 
in medicine, and seek to collect and use better data before arriving at 
decisions.  Indeed, those who are attracted to such a solution might look 
optimistically to the rising tide of empirical analyses of legal policy 
questions.  But before we confidently board the evidence-based train, it is 
critical that we pause and reflect on the ways that getting the right evidence 
relating to questions of litigation policy differs from what is typical in the 
medical world, or even what is typical for most questions of regulatory 
policy.   
Unfortunately, those who would create the architectural rules of 
litigation face a special challenge: one of the key variables of interest when 
comparing rules is the degree to which they promote the accurate resolution 
of cases, but no easy metric exists external to the litigation system that 
allows for broad comparisons of the accuracy of case results.  So if we want 
to get the benefits of evidence-based procedural design, neither the 
observation of existing cases, or even experiments where we compare 
differing rules, will give us the answers that we need.  As a result, the costs 
of an evidence-based litigation movement are higher than they initially 
appear, and procedural designers should proceed with great caution before 
making decisions based on the sort of data that existing empirical 
scholarship can provide. 
A. An Example: Assessing the Civil Gideon Debate 
The need for accuracy measurement can best be illustrated by 
considering another example: the ongoing debate about the right to 
appointed counsel in civil cases.  For most of Anglo-American legal 
history, it was commonplace for parties even in the most serious criminal 
cases to self-represent.220  In serious criminal cases, in fact, defendants were 
actively forbidden counsel for hundreds of years.221  After a series of 
scandals involving prominent convictions (and executions) obtained by 
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perjured evidence in the late seventeenth century, the tide began to turn, and 
it slowly became possible for those felony defendants who could afford 
attorneys to retain them as trial counsel.222  But most criminal defendants 
are not rich, and so many went without legal advice or representation even 
in this new system.223    
Only very recently has the tide shifted towards the widespread use of 
appointed counsel by the indigent.224  In 1963, the Supreme Court held in 
Gideon v. Wainright that the Constitution required states to provide indigent 
felony defendants with state-funded counsel.225  This decision is widely 
held up as a momentous improvement in the fairness and accuracy of 
American criminal prosecutions.226  But although Gideon firmly entrenched 
a right for criminal defendants to receive counsel, there are numerous other 
areas of litigation, including most types of civil cases, where indigent 
parties do not have a right to be represented at state expense.227  Those who 
oppose this state of affairs label themselves the “Civil Gideon” 
movement.228 
So let us consider the debate that is joined between the Civil Gideonites 
and the defenders of the status quo.  On the status quo side, there are some 
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reasons why we might be skeptical that Gideon has been beneficial either 
for defendants or for society in general.  For one thing, the Court has been 
reluctant to extend its ruling to contexts not involving potential 
incarceration, suggesting some lingering uncertainty about the need for 
appointed lawyers in all cases.229  For another, a right to appointed counsel 
is meaningful only to the extent that such counsel is well-funded and well-
monitored; the modern history of indigent criminal defense, by contrast, is 
one of “grossly inadequate funding” in which courts are extremely 
deferential to decisions made by highly overburdened counsel.230   
Overburdened appointed attorneys have strong incentives to conduct little 
investigation into their cases and to pressure defendants to settle, and those 
incentives may lead the defendants with meritorious cases to be funneled 
into the same plea machine as the guilty ones.231  Although this situation 
could in theory be resolved through better funding and better oversight of 
public defender agencies, in practice criminal defendants as a group lack the 
political capital to successfully advance a reform agenda.  Still, the Civil 
Gideonites might reply that all of these reasons for doubt are merely 
suggestive and that the alternatives are likely to be worse.  As the Gideon 
Court observed, “[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman” may “lack[] 
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one.”232  So perhaps even a very poor appointed 
attorney is better than proceeding pro se.   
So we have a pressing puzzle on our hands: Does appointing counsel 
help the indigent, and if so, does it make the system as a whole function 
better?  There is a large empirical literature attempting to quantify the 
benefits and costs of appointed counsel, but sadly it turns out to be of little 
use.  Advocates of Civil Gideon can point to a deluge of observational 
studies showing that represented litigants tend to fare better than those who 
represent themselves.233  Despite this onslaught of case data, status quo 
defenders have a potent counterattack: observational studies tell us little 
about the true effects of representation because they are subject to severe 
selection effects.234  The problem with comparing the outcomes that pro se 
and represented litigants achieve is that lawyers are not randomly assigned 
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to indigent claimants in civil settings; rather, lawyers seek out cases with 
merit.235  On the flip side, the indigent litigants who are most likely to seek 
out representation may constitute a “disproportionately worldy, future-
looking, and risk-averse” subpopulation who may be more likely to prevail 
in litigation regardless of whether they have a lawyer’s aid.236    
Better data can be obtained by conducting randomized experiments, 
which can create control and treatment groups of indigent litigants who are 
as near identical as possible except with respect to the offer of 
representation.237  But this inquiry has rarely been conducted, and when it 
has the results have been mixed, with a few studies showing positive 
impacts of representation and others finding that representation does not 
increase the odds of success but does slow down the process of litigation.238    
One way to read such mixed results would be to conclude that in trying 
to decide when counsel should be appointed, detail is everything.  Different 
case types and regions may raise or lower the value of having a lawyer in 
ways that are hard to predict in advance, although it is possible to concoct 
just-so stories to explain data once we have them.  In short, we see again the 
problem of procedural complexity, and it seems like the most promising 
response is to run more experiments in a variety of settings, trying to see 
when appointing counsel is helpful and when it is counterproductive.239  
The only alternative is to trust our intuitions even when randomized 
experiments indicate that they are sometimes unreliable. 
But there is a deeper problem with this debate, one that we cannot see 
unless we are willing to reframe the measures by which we evaluate the 
value of a right to counsel.  Recall the discussion above regarding the 
modern medical movement towards outcome-based measurement in 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 235  See id. at 2195. 
 236  Id. at 2192.  
 237  See ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 98, at 15–22.  
 238  See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 144, at 2118 (finding no association between the offer of 
legal assistance and success on the merits in administrative appeals of the unemployment assistance 
denials); D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a 
Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1948286 (finding that offers of full traditional legal assistance 
helped clients prevail in eviction disputes in Massachusetts district court). 
 239  Of course, even this neglects the true level of legal complexity involved.  A brief experiment 
regarding the effects of representation may not capture the value (or costs) that a system-wide guarantee 
would have over the long term, because many legal actors might change their behavior over time in 
response to the new guarantee in ways that are hard to predict.  Likewise, the identity of the appointed 
representatives might be different in a study than would be the case once reforms are institutionalized.  
A civil “public defense” office may not litigate as effectively as volunteer attorneys whose performance 
is measured in a study—or perhaps they may develop specialized expertise and litigate more effectively.   
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validating the efficacy of medical procedures and diagnostic tests.240  Often, 
a medical researcher has the choice between measuring something that is 
inexpensive to determine, like cholesterol levels or blood pressure, versus 
something that is harder to measure, like long-term changes in mortality or 
subjective assessments of overall patient well-being.241  Unfortunately, 
choosing the easy-to-measure proxy can have serious penalties for the value 
of a research design: given that the body is a very complex environment, 
sometimes an intervention may seem to have a positive impact on a proxy 
outcome while also having a non-existent—or even harmful—effect on 
overall health.242  Therefore, if one wishes to maximize the ability of 
medicine to improve patient health, it is best to validate tests and 
procedures by measuring their impacts on overall health rather than on 
temporary signs that may, or may not, signal true improvements in well-
being.243 
Returning to the Civil Gideon example, we can perceive a similar 
dichotomy between cheap-but-accessible and expensive-but-instructive 
measurements when we study the efficacy of procedural rules in litigation.  
Whether based on statistical analysis of ordinary cases or random 
assignment of representational offers, most existing studies of procedural 
impact have a common structure: they either observe or experimentally vary 
the availability of representation, and then they observe and record certain 
variables about case outcomes, trying to detect a link between the two.244  In 
theory, well-designed studies that focus on case outcomes, without 
measuring accuracy, could help us answer the following questions: Does 
representation make a litigant more or less likely to win?  Does it make the 
case take more or less time to resolve?  Does it increase, or decrease, 
settlement rates?  But they cannot possibly answer what may be the most 
important question: Does appointing counsel for indigent clients make it 
more or less likely that the ultimate outcome in the case is right?245  After 
all, it is at least possible that appointing counsel tends to help more parties 
prevail, but that the increase comes primarily in the form of false positives 
rather than true positives, and that the overall accuracy of the system 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 240  See discussion supra Part II.E. 
 241  See Deyo, supra note 69, at 65–66. 
 242  See id.  See generally Oliver et al., supra note 135, at 379–85. 
 243  See Oliver et al., supra note 135, at 385. 
 244  See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 144, at 2118.  See generally Greiner et al., supra note 238. 
 245  Readers who worry that my use of the word “right” masks a great deal of complexity are correct 
and are urged to be patient.  I will discuss the theoretic depths involved in trying to measure accuracy in 
outcomes infra. 
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suffers.  Such a result would run strongly counter to the widely shared urge 
to make civil litigation outcomes reflect real world facts as accurately as we 
can,246 subject to the constraints of cost and practicality.  So long as we 
focus on what is relatively easy to measure, like who wins, but not on what 
matters more, like whether the case outcomes are more or less accurate, the 
real significance of these studies will be necessarily limited. 
This concern—that without measuring variations in the accuracy of 
litigation results, existing studies tell us little about how well the 
appointment of indigent counsel furthers some of the justice system’s key 
goals—is not unique to the right-to-counsel debate.  For instance, the 
identical difficulty subverts scholarly attempts to assess the merits of the 
recent pleading revolution.  Even at its best, this empirical literature is 
unable to get at the questions that are of real theoretical interest in the 
“Twiqbal” debate.  Suppose, for instance, that despite its limits the FJC 
study correctly indicates that Twombly and Iqbal have caused judges to 
dismiss more cases for failure to state a claim.247  That might be a very good 
thing, if most of the dismissed cases are in fact frivolous, or a very bad 
thing, if judges are using their newfound freedom to dismiss worthy cases 
brought by unpopular groups of plaintiffs.248  One doubts, after all, that the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in these cases hoping to have no effect on 
pleading practice.  Rather, the aim was to screen out frivolous cases without 
affecting meritorious ones.249  If the new rule truly achieves this, it should 
be subject to far less criticism than critics presently aim at it.  At the same 
time, the situation might be inverted; frivolous plaintiffs may well be able 
to plead plausible cases most of the time, while some deserving plaintiffs 
may lack access to the facts they need.  But unless we find a way to 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 246  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 1 (1994).  But cf. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (urging that minimizing 
false convictions is more important than maximizing true convictions). 
 247  See CECIL ET AL., supra note 184, at 21 (finding an increase in the rate at which motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim were granted in cases involving financial instruments); Hoffman, 
supra note 187, at 4–5. 
 248  See Moore, supra note 189, at 654 (noting that case outcome data cannot tell us whether 
dismissals are occurring in the cases where they “should happen”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims 
of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 54–55 (providing evidence that the post-Iqbal 
increase in the rate of reported dismissals is higher in race discrimination suits brought by black 
plaintiffs than it is in the larger population of suits examined by Moore). 
 249  See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007) (expressing a worry that a 
plaintiff with “a largely groundless claim” could effectively “take up the time of a number of other 
people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value,” if such 
cases cannot be screened out at the pleading stage) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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measure not just the difference in dismissal rates under the two regimes, but 
also the comparative validity of the claims that survive and the claims that 
are dismissed under each rule, we really are just guessing when we 
conclude that the extra dismissals are cause for concern.   
B. How Worrying Is Our Failure to Measure Accuracy? 
We presently lack any way to systematically assess whether a given 
change to a system of dispute resolution makes it function more or less 
effectively, because we have no external means to track whether a given 
change makes case outcomes more or less accurate on the margin.  To see 
just how troubling this is, imagine if medical researchers could measure the 
cost of new drugs and some of the side effects they produce, but were 
barred by medical protocol from measuring whether their drugs make the 
patients healthier or sicker.  Such an environment would give us little 
reason to trust the beneficence of drugs on the market, so by analogy we 
should harbor similar doubts with respect to current legal procedures.  But 
some may wish to resist this analogy, and urge that we either have ways of 
determining accuracy without resort to systematic measurement, or that 
accuracy is not important enough to be worth measuring.  Several 
arguments along these lines will be considered in turn. 
Some might object that the existing appellate process already operates 
to test the accuracy of case outcomes and provides overall data regarding 
the accuracy of trial procedures.  This response fails for a number of 
reasons.  First, using data from appeals to measure the appropriateness of 
case resolutions suffers from serious selection bias: most cases filed are 
never appealed, even though every case filed is resolved in some fashion.250  
Some of the filters are legal rules restricting when an appeal can be taken, 
while others involve the incentives that parties have to avoid disturbing a 
status quo.  One of the most common situations is when parties settle their 
disputes and thus lack either the legal standing or the desire to further 
litigate their claims.251  But if we care about the accuracy of procedures, we 
must measure the degree to which settlements track the underlying merit of 
cases.  What is more, this selection bias will exist even in many cases where 
an appeal was taken.  Many potential grounds for appeal rely on procedural 
issues that do not touch the factual merits of the underlying claims.252  In 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 250  See Clermont, supra note 159, at 1972. 
 251  See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
 252  See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 10–11 (observing that many wrongful convictions go undetected 
by an appellate process that focuses on detecting procedural, rather than factual, errors). 
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such cases, the result on appeal will tell us nothing about the factual validity 
of the pre-appeal outcome, and it may be very hard to separate out such 
procedural grounds of review from substantive ones when studying a large 
dataset of cases. 
Second, appellate review ordinarily involves both formal and informal 
deference to the decision making of a lower court.253  As a result, if we use 
appellate reversals as a measure of error, we will systematically undercount 
such errors.  So if, for example, we are looking at a subset of cases that lead 
to jury verdicts, appellate data will not tell us how often such verdicts are 
incorrect, but instead only how often they were so incorrect as to be 
“unreasonable.”  This means that such data will systematically undercount 
factual errors at trial.254 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, using appellate review as a 
measure of accuracy separates one piece of a complex system from the 
larger whole in a way that interferes with useful measurement.  After all, if 
we are trying to measure the accuracy of legal outcomes, the outcome of 
most interest is what happens after all legal procedures have run their 
course.  The appellate process is one aspect of the whole, and it may 
interact with whatever changes we are trying to assess.  In the end, the error 
measurement we would get by using appellate reversal rates would be 
worthless: each error counted would be one that the system as a whole 
would make right, while none of those errors that are the true concern 
would be measured at all.   
It seems, therefore, that we lack any systematic information on the 
litigation system’s validity.  Nevertheless, one can still ask, is that really a 
problem?  For some, the realization that we just do not know how accurate 
our system is will be maddening, while others will shrug.  So before turning 
to how we can go about measuring, it is worth considering whether it is 
worth the bother.255   
There are several reasons why our lack of systematic data collection 
might seem to be less harmful than it initially appears.  One sort of doubter 
might say that accuracy, all things considered, is not a weighty enough 
variable in the procedural calculus to be worth tracking, at least if the 
tracking must be costly.  Surely, they would say, there is much more to 
legal decision making than getting the facts right, and indeed much of what 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 253  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (instructing appellate courts to defer to the factual findings of 
trial judges unless those findings are clearly erroneous). 
 254  See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 10–11. 
 255  Cf. Bone, supra note 208, at 599 (noting that scientific testing “is not the exclusive route to 
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judges and juries do involves the exercise of wisdom and discretion rather 
than the reconstruction of historical events.256    
There may well be a fairly broad ideological chasm between those who 
believe that the goal of accuracy in outcomes is the central benefit we seek 
in designing procedure257 and others who think it is merely one virtue of 
trials among many, and perhaps not even the most important one.   
Nevertheless, I believe that the difficulty of measuring accuracy in legal 
outcomes should be of concern to most people interested in procedural 
design.  For one thing, it will be rare indeed to find someone who goes 
beyond listing other procedural values to take the position that accuracy is 
harmful or even useless.258  Rather, the more common intuition will be that 
we value accuracy as well as other things, such as results that do moral 
justice or procedures that feel fair to participants.259  But once this much is 
granted, then the failure to measure one key goal among others still seems 
problematic.  If we found out that medical researchers were failing to 
measure the effect of new drugs on health, it would be of little solace to 
discover that they were able to carefully measure side effects, even if we 
believed that minimizing side effects was very important.   
Even if we think accuracy is less important than other values, this 
analogy still holds.  We care most about curing disease, but we still think it 
valuable to collect data on the side effects and costs of new therapies.  
Moreover, our ability to reliably achieve some of these other values, like an 
emphasis on the ability of the system to allow individuals to vindicate 
wrongs done against them, may depend on its ability to regularly figure out 
the right facts.260  This would mean that enhancing our ability to maximize 
accuracy also helps us further these other values.  After all, few if any moral 
theories would permit us to determine who is blameworthy and who is not 
without reference to at least some facts about their past conduct or states of 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 256  See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 235–40 (1999) (urging that the structure of our 
trials enables the jury to integrate reconstructions of historical fact with practical and moral judgments to 
produce an amalgam justice “which is often immeasurably richer” than the outcome of a process 
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 257  Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 
319, 337 (2008) (expressing skepticism that the demands of participatory rights can ever rise above the 
needs of adjudicative accuracy).   
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 259  See BURNS, supra note 256, at 239; Solum, supra note 9, at 320–21. 
 260  See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1, 82–87 (1998) (describing the dignitary and social values that support permitting those who have been 
harmed to personally seek redress against their wrongdoers using state-supplied mechanisms, and noting 
that this value only extends to those cases where the defendant actually violated a right held by the 
plaintiff). 
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mind.261  Therefore, most pluralists should be worried about the present 
failure to measure accuracy in adjudication. 
Despite these responses, however, there is a deeper concern, which is 
that the concept of accurate case outcomes is too confused to be capable of 
measurement.  Many, if not most, legal outcomes do not offer a clear 
distinction between factual and normative judgments.262  A jury verdict, for 
example, may encode historical assumptions, future predictions, and 
normative judgments of blameworthiness into a finding of liability and a 
damages award.263  Likewise, lawyers may rely on factual assumptions 
when negotiating civil settlements, but the ultimate agreement does not 
come with a narrative description of what happened that gave rise to the 
settlement.264  And when judges dispose of a case on a procedural ground, 
they often deliberately avoid making any comment on its underlying factual 
merits.265  So many case dispositions blur, or even omit entirely, an inquiry 
into what “really happened” in the past. 
But even though many case dispositions may not articulate or rely upon 
a particular set of found facts, it is still meaningful to ask whether the 
relevant decision makers correctly understood the facts that gave rise to the 
dispute when making their decisions.  Lawyers and judges must regularly 
make decisions that rely on an interplay of at least three key features: the 
facts as they understand them, the legal rules that oblige certain results, and 
their own preferences (to the extent they have discretion to give effect to 
them).266  Even if a given outcome depends upon a discretionary choice or a 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 261  Among ethical theories, the two dominant frameworks focus either on evaluating acts by 
reference to the consequences they produce or else by the “moral quality of the act . . . in itself.”  See R. 
George Wright, Combating Civilian Casualties: Rules and Balancing in the Developing Law of War, 38 
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detail before any reasonable assessment of its ethical propriety can be conducted. 
 262  See BURNS, supra note 256, at 235. 
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explanation of jury verdicts by using special verdict forms); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) (requiring a 
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 265  See, e.g., 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1353 (3d ed. 
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dismissing an action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), are not “on the merits” and are not intended to preclude 
future litigation in which the defect has been corrected). 
 266  See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 309–10 (1997) (explaining that one must look to 
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legal rule, the choice or rule arises based on a factual foundation and might 
change if the facts were different.267  So when a mistaken factual 
understanding leads to a different outcome than would have occurred were 
the true picture known to the decision makers, we can label that outcome 
inaccurate even if it does not come with an explicit explanation. 
There is a second sense in which factual accuracy matters even for 
decisions that are not explicitly or solely factual.  Take settlements as an 
example.  We might care how well lawyers on average understand the facts 
before they settle, but we might also feel that even if some information is 
hidden from both sides, the process of negotiation might aggregate both 
sides’ incomplete information into a single sum that in some sense 
incorporates more information than either party possesses.  We must be 
careful here: there is no meaningful sense in which we can say that there is 
an amount that a case “should” settle for based solely on the historical facts 
that gave rise to it, so settlement amounts by themselves cannot be said to 
be accurate or inaccurate.  Nevertheless, we might care how well settlement 
values correlate with certain important underlying case facts, such as the 
extent of injuries suffered by the plaintiff or the degree to which a physician 
acted contrary to ordinary treatment protocols.  Although the settlement 
amounts cannot be said to be trying to “reconstruct” such data, they do arise 
from a process that we intend to respond to variances in those data.  So if 
settlement amounts are failing to reflect variations in the underlying facts in 
the way we would desire, that information is relevant to the design of the 
overall system. 
An example may make this point more concrete.  Several studies, most 
published in medical journals, have sought to assess how well the 
malpractice litigation system functions as a means of separating negligent 
medical errors from other causes of patient morbidity.268  One of the most 
recent and most thorough investigations was conducted by David Studdert 
and his co-authors in 2006.269  This group of researchers analyzed a large 
sample of closed malpractice claims, using independent physicians to 
analyze the insurers’ case files in order to determine, to the best of their 
ability, which cases involved injured patients and how many of those 
                                                                                                                           
analysis). 
 267  See id. at 310 (noting that “political decision making takes account of facts as well”). 
 268  See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the 
Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963 (1996); Frederick W. Cheney 
et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA 1599 (1989); Henry S. Farber & Michelle 
J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 777 (1994); David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006). 
 269  Studdert et al., supra note 268, at 2024. 
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injuries were due to “medical errors.”270  They then compared these 
judgments with the cases’ outcomes, in an attempt to see how often the tort 
system produced results similar to what the experts would have viewed as 
appropriate.271  This allowed them to produce some interesting 
comparisons: 73% of the claims they studied appeared to be either true 
positives, in which compensation was provided to a claimant who had been 
injured by medical errors, or true negatives, in which compensation was not 
provided to a claimant who was either uninjured or whose injuries were not 
attributable to medical mistakes.272  Of the remaining quarter of claims, just 
over 10% involved false positives, in the form of payment given to those 
who had not suffered an injury due to error, while a slightly larger fraction 
of 16% involved false negatives, in the form of payments denied to those 
who seemed deserving.273 
Without belaboring the pluses and minuses of this particular 
investigation,274 the approach employed by it and other similar malpractice 
studies is quite instructive.  By comparing the underlying facts of litigation 
with its results, the authors are able to obtain insight on a question that is 
rarely explored.  That is, we can get some sense of how successful the tort 
system is at figuring out what happened in the past.  And although this 
study (and the others like it that I have been able to find) attempted only to 
provide a descriptive picture of how the current litigation system was 
functioning, one could combine this novel approach to measuring the 
validity of litigation outcomes with an experimental variation of procedural 
rules to gain a truly powerful tool for separating useful procedural 
innovations from harmful ones.  So, when we would prefer that certain facts 
correlate substantially with litigation results, one way of assessing how 
accurate the legal system is at compensating the right claims is to measure 
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the relationship between the incidences of those facts with typical case 
results. 
In the end, it seems that most policy makers and critics who wish to 
optimize procedural efficacy should care both about how well legal decision 
makers understand the cases they decide, and how well their decisions 
correlate with the objective facts that the law purports to respond to.  So 
most of those who seek to maximize accuracy (along with other values) in a 
juridical system should be interested in finding ways to measure accuracy in 
a more systemic and sustained way. 
There is, however, one procedural value that may cut strongly in the 
other direction.  Those who privilege the system’s legitimacy over all 
competing values may be hesitant to look too closely at the details of its 
performance, for fear of undermining the public’s faith in our courts.275  
Many are properly concerned that legal procedures be viewed as legitimate 
both by those who use them as well as by the broader public who observe 
proceedings from a distance.276  There are several reasons for this concern.  
For one thing, people more readily comply with legal rules concerning 
primary conduct when they view legal institutions in a positive light.277  
And for some, it may be more important for disputes “to be settled than [for 
them] to be settled right,”278 if the alternative is viewed as private self-help 
and a gradual descent into social chaos.  Indeed, if we are frank with 
ourselves, we must admit that exposing the large amount of ignorance we 
possess about the utility of our legal procedures might be a poor public 
relations move for the litigation system.   
For some, this argument may be so powerful as to make any proposal 
for increased outcome measurement a non-starter, but I suspect that most 
will have a different intuition upon reflection.  Caring so much about 
legitimacy that we ignore accuracy considerations should leave a very bad 
taste in our mouths.279  There would be a strong element of deceit at play if 
policy makers and critics know that the justice system is not being careful 
to ensure it is getting it right as often as possible but avert their eyes from 
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the problem for fear of the public’s reaction.280  It was one thing for medical 
science to treat without measuring when few realized that measurement 
could help; it would be another for modern medicine to eschew a practice 
that has such broad benefits for public health.  Perhaps one guidepost that 
might caution us to avoid such a course is this: if we fully informed the 
public we were trying to protect of the reasons why we might wish to avoid 
putting our adjudicative procedures to the test, there are a number of 
reasons they might accept (such as a concern for their privacy or an 
outlandish cost).  It would be very surprising, however, if they would accept 
the strong paternalism present in the decision to subject them to the whims 
of a legal system that we could have, but have not, tested for accuracy and 
fairness.   
C. The Risks of Trusting an Untested Procedural System 
Assuming that we agree that accuracy is important and that we could 
measure it if we were willing to try, is there any further reason to object to a 
call for investigations along these lines?  Perhaps there is.  Many readers 
may feel that this is all much ado about nothing; even if we do not track 
accuracy systematically, they might say, our procedures are so well- 
designed that there is little to worry about.281  Note that this can be true 
even if we grant the point made in a previous section that we are bad at 
predicting how rules will affect the overall system.282  Perhaps the social 
pressures that constrain our legal system gradually nudge it towards good 
equilibria (including high rates of accuracy) by aggregating the decisions of 
many different decision makers even though none of those individuals 
understand the whole.283  Our failure to measure accuracy means we cannot 
use data to support such a notion, but if we had strong intuitions that the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 280  See Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural 
Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 171, 193 (2005); Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and Procedural 
Justice: Moving from Scientific Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 647, 656–
59 (1993). 
 281  See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our society 
has a high degree of confidence in its criminal trials, in no small part because the Constitution offers 
unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent.”); United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 
(S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand, J.) (calling the idea of wrongful convictions in our legal system an “unreal 
dream”). 
 282  See discussion supra Parts II, III. 
 283  See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 61 (1977).  
But see Allen, supra note 3, at 16–18 (describing our legal system as a “system of interconnected nodes 
that looks somewhat like a neural network,” but doubting that this network operates to optimize any 
consistent set of variables about legal rules or litigation results). 
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legal system was self-optimizing, that might be enough to make the costs of 
the necessary data gathering too much to bear. 
There are two possible responses to such nonchalance.  The first is to 
note that even if our system is doing pretty well, we might still reasonably 
wish to either improve its accuracy further, or else attempt to maintain its 
accuracy while decreasing the cost or delay associated with obtaining 
resolution of legal claims.   Even among those who have the intuition that 
the American litigation system functions adequately, I doubt there are many 
who feel that it is beyond any possible improvement.  But so long as we are 
unable to measure the accuracy of changes in procedure, we cannot tell 
when we are cutting costs at no detriment to justice and when we are saving 
money by sacrificing quality.  In other words, if we must balance multiple 
factors in designing procedure, we cannot truly say that any change is an 
improvement (or even a neutral trade-off) unless we are measuring each of 
those factors.  And given the extremely complex nature of the system itself, 
and the sometimes counterintuitive results of interventions,284 we should be 
very reluctant to trust mere intuition that any given cost-cutting measure 
comes at no cost to our system’s accuracy. 
But we can, and should, go further in responding to those who see no 
need to measure how often we get it right or wrong: concluding too readily 
that our confidence in our system is predictive of its accuracy stands in 
stark contrast to the historical record of legal fact-finding.  History shows 
that people have often placed their faith and trust in very inaccurate 
methods of finding facts.285  And in the present day, the recent spate of 
DNA-based exonerations286 serves to underline the point: so long as we fail 
to measure the quality of our system’s outputs, we have little reason to trust 
that it is functioning in an optimal way. 
Start with the historical record: the past provides numerous examples of 
people who, in good faith, relied on dispute resolution systems that we 
would find impossible to trust.  For instance, consider the trial by ordeal.  
Like us, the residents of early medieval England had disputes and a need to 
resolve them, but when faced with two disputing parties they did not engage 
in a process of sifting through evidence to reconstruct historical facts to 
decide who should prevail.287  Rather, they relied on God to decide whose 
version of events was true and whose was false, and they forced God to 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 284  See discussion supra Part II. 
 285  See discussion supra Part II.A.  
 286  See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 1–13 (describing some of the common features of the first 250 
DNA exonerations). 
 287  LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE: ORIGINS OF TRIAL BY JURY 5 (1999). 
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show his hand by means of such procedures as the ordeal.288   In the ordeal, 
one party to a dispute would be put to a physical test in which “he called 
upon God to witness his innocence by putting a miraculous sign upon his 
body,” such as healing a burn wound without sepsis, causing him to sink 
rather than float upon water, or swallow a large morsel of dry food without 
choking.289   Anyone who thinks that common sense alone is a reasonable 
guide towards designing fair procedures must face the difficult fact that 
common sense beliefs may be systematically wrong,290 and the ordeal 
example shows that such widespread error is not only possible, but that it 
can dominate a legal system for centuries without widespread criticism.291 
Some readers may balk at the first example because it involved 
explicitly religious assumptions about proof.  If so, consider a practice that 
lasted for centuries and that was still in widespread use during the first 
century of American life: the bar on testimony by interested witnesses.292  
This rule totally precluded parties and other interested witnesses from 
giving testimony under oath.293  From the 1500s until the mid-nineteenth 
century, the firm policy of the judiciary was that a long list of potential 
witnesses—including the parties in a civil case, criminal defendants, anyone 
with a financial interest in the case’s outcome, anyone previously convicted 
of a felony, and atheists—were so likely to lie on the stand that it was better 
to dismiss cases entirely for lack of evidence than hear what they had to 
say.294  In many cases, the result was that one party had no evidence to offer 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 288  Id. at 5–6; S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 359 (1st ed. 1969). 
 289  LEVY, supra note 287, at 5.  
 290  Nor is it only in the distant past that common sense can be so misleading.  For a present-day 
example, consider the widespread assumption that observing witnesses testify increases the likelihood of 
accurate deception detection, which is probably false.  See Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper 
Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 835–51 (2011).  
 291  See LEVY, supra note 287, at 5.  A parallel, and equally disturbing, example can be found in 
continental practice.  In the Roman canon law tradition, tortured confessions were frequently the basis 
for criminal convictions.  See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary 
Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 594 (1990).  This practice evolved 
as a work-around for the strict formal rule that had required at least two witnesses to testify against an 
accused before any conviction could be obtained.  Id.  The reliability of a confession obtained under 
torture is, of course, highly suspect. 
 292  James Oldham, Truth-Telling in the Eighteenth-Century English Courtroom, 12 LAW & HIST. REV. 95, 
107–09 (1994).  
 293  Id.   
 294  Id. at 102, 107–09; see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *363–64, *370.  
Blackstone lists “treason, felony, perjury, . . . conspiracy,” “outlaw[ry],” “excommunicat[ion],” “attaint 
of false verdict,” and “forgery” among the reasons that a person would have been too infamous to serve 
as a juror, and then notes that such persons were equally disallowed to testify as witnesses.  Id.  
Perversely, the victim in a criminal case, who also acted as prosecutor, did not fall within the ambit of 
this rule.  Oldham, supra note 292, at 107; cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 
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at all to press a claim or defend against it, even if that party would have 
resisted the temptation to testify deceptively. As a result, many valid claims 
were likely deterred.295  Once again, we see that a great multitude of judges 
and lawyers placed their trust in procedures that most today would view as 
deeply inaccurate and unfair. 
Finally, for those who think we have surely risen above the ignorance 
and errors of our past, consider a recent example: the string of DNA-
evidence exonerations of wrongfully convicted felons.296  On one level, the 
introduction of DNA evidence might seem like a basis for increased trust in 
our legal system.  Indeed, the strength of a properly conducted DNA match 
provides our modern “gold standard” for placing a criminal defendant at the 
scene of a crime.  But the very accuracy of this device has enabled it to 
expose ugly flaws in our system of justice: numerous cases that seemed 
quite ordinary at the time they were decided turned out to have placed 
innocent people in prison.297  The distressing fact that the DNA exoneration 
cases illuminate is that most wrongfully decided cases look almost exactly 
like accurately decided cases.  The defect in such cases does not lie in the 
facts known to actors in the legal system, but rather in the facts they failed 
to discover or bring to light.298  Nor can we comfort ourselves much with 
the fact that the exonerations are relatively few when placed against the vast 
number of criminal convictions.  Unfortunately, only a small proportion of 
decided cases involve untested, but still existing, DNA evidence that can 
implicate or exonerate a convicted defendant. 299  Because of this, we cannot 
form even a crude estimate of the overall accuracy of our criminal systems 
by counting these exonerations.  But when placed alongside the historical 
record of trust in highly dubious procedural devices, the number of DNA-
based exonerations of run-of-the-mill convictions should make us very 
hesitant to place blind trust in the accuracy of our system. 
                                                                                                                           
56 (1827) (noting the absurd extent to which these interest-based incompetency rules were enforced, 
based upon the apparent assumption that there was “no Englishman” who “would not perjure himself” 
for a farthing). 
 295  See generally John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American Self-
Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 860–66 (1999) (tracing some of the many 
complaints that led to the doctrine’s belated decline). 
 296  See generally GARRETT, supra note 16, at 1–13. 
 297  See id. (describing some 250 DNA-based exonerations). 
 298  See Rosen, supra note 16, at 73 (noting that “[u]ntil the moment when the DNA test results came 
back, almost none of these cases [in which DNA evidence revealed that a conviction was in error] would 
have been considered exceptional among criminal cases”). 
 299  See GARRETT, supra note 16, at 12 (“If DNA is a ‘truth machine,’ it tells us only about a sliver of 
very serious convictions, most for rape, chiefly from the 1980s.”). 
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V. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: PROCEDURAL EXPERIMENTS THAT 
MEASURE ACCURACY 
In the preceding sections, we have seen that systematic measurement 
has revolutionized the practice of medicine, although there is still a long 
way to go before the evidence-based medicine movement can be said to 
have prevailed fully.300  Rule makers face great challenges when they 
design or amend rules of procedure and evidence because the litigation 
environment is a complex system in which it is often difficult to link 
procedural cause with substantive effect.301  For this reason, an evidence-
based litigation movement might be very attractive, but reformers will not 
be able to meaningfully assess the impact of differing rules or rule 
applications on the accuracy of case outcomes unless they are willing to go 
beyond measuring who wins because simple outcomes make a poor proxy 
for the real variables of procedural interest.  In particular, if studies fail to 
measure accuracy and focus instead on other variables like litigant 
satisfaction or cost, we will have little basis for confidence that 
improvements in these other variables are not coming at the cost of the 
system’s ability to accurately divine the factual merits of litigants’ cases.  
Until this problem is addressed, the value of both existing rules and 
proposed reforms to them must always remain uncertain for any person who 
thinks that accurate outcomes matter.  In this section, I will discuss the 
challenges inherent in measuring the accuracy of a procedural system and 
sketch one possible means for accomplishing this difficult task. 
The evidence-based medicine movement can provide us some 
inspiration as we try to develop methods of determining the impact of rules 
on the accuracy of legal outcomes.  One important lesson we can learn from 
doctors is the value of attending both to easily measurable surrogate 
outcomes and also more subjective ultimate outcomes of deeper theoretic 
interest, depending on the specific goals of an investigation.302  In medicine, 
doctors sometimes track immediate biophysical signs, such as biopsy 
results or cholesterol levels, either as indicators of broader patient health or 
as interesting in their own right.303  Depending on the question of interest, 
procedural investigators could similarly compare legal outcomes with 
individual details of underlying cases.  As discussed above, a number of 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 300  See discussion supra Part II. 
 301  See generally Allen, supra note 3. 
 302  See Deyo, supra note 69, at 70–71. 
 303  See STRAUS ET AL., supra note 122, at 72–73. 
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investigations into the accuracy of medical malpractice litigation outcomes 
have proceeded in this way, comparing the outcomes of claims with expert 
determinations of whether medical errors occurred.304  These studies have 
given unique insight into this realm of litigation, enabling us to get rough 
estimates as to how often settlements are given to both deserving and 
undeserving claimants, as well as how often culpable doctors avoid legal 
judgments against them.305 
One lesson from the evidence-based medicine movement, however, is 
that such intermediate measurement can lead to systematic errors, given that 
factors like blood pressure are imperfect predictors of overall health.306  The 
modern trend in evidence-based medicine is towards looking at more 
ultimate indicators of health, like changes in overall mortality or morbidity 
on longer time scales, rather than immediate biophysical signs.307   
Unfortunately, the factual accuracy of case outcomes is harder to 
measure than whether a patient lives or dies.  It may be valuable to know 
how brute facts like who prevails or how much they win correlate with 
various underlying case facts, but such correlations will ultimately allow 
only a blurry estimate of the deeper idea of adjudicative accuracy.  As 
discussed above,308 one of the most critical quantities of interest for 
procedural design would be a measure of the correspondence between the 
factual understanding that motivated the legal result in a case and the actual 
set of historical facts that gave rise to the litigation.  Such a comparison 
would isolate the component of the decision that is primarily about the facts 
that are being disputed from the legal doctrines, personal preferences, and 
moral judgments that help decision makers translate facts into outcomes.  
And while qualitative descriptions of similarities and differences would be 
interesting, more useful for the purposes of measuring the impact of 
possible rules on overall accuracy would be a single accuracy score that can 
be compared between many different types of case outcomes and subject 
matters under dispute.  Thus, the product of accuracy measurement, in an 
ideal world, would be a single value that incorporates both the number of 
factual disagreements between the motivating and actual facts, as well as 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 304  See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 268, at 1963–64; Cheney et al., supra note 268, at 1599; 
Farber & White, supra note 268, at 795; Studdert et al., supra note 268, at 2024. 
 305  See, e.g., Studdert et al, supra note 268, at 2028 (finding that, in about a quarter of malpractice 
cases, the availability of a settlement did not correlate with whether medical error had occurred). 
 306  See discussion supra Part II.D. 
 307  See Deyo, supra note 69, at 70–71. 
 308  See discussion supra Part III. 
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some indication of the relative importance of those facts to the decision 
maker.309   
In the search for an objective method for evaluating procedural success, 
we are quickly confronted with the reality that the very concept of accuracy 
depends on both the subjective motivations of a legal decision maker and 
the qualitative judgment of a reviewer or group of reviewers.  Despite what 
some readers may think, however, this is not fatal to the overall project of 
measuring adjudicative accuracy.  Measuring overall patient health or pain 
levels involves a great deal of subjectivity, but tracking such data is 
extremely important if you wish to make real people healthier rather than 
just optimize various test results.310  And in some cases, medical 
measurement properly incorporates even greater amounts of subjectivity.  
Rates of psychiatric disease, for example, are grounded in individual 
clinical comparisons of a patient’s mental and social functioning with a 
range of behavior that is defined to be aberrant.311  So long as the target of 
measurement is a quantity of important theoretic interest and the 
measurement process has an acceptable rate of reliability, subjectivity in 
coding measurements need not be fatal to the goals of accuracy tracking.312 
A second challenge looms: Where do we get data concerning the 
motivating factual understanding and the historic factual reality?  For some 
litigation outcomes, the motivating factual understanding may be fairly 
transparent.  Judicial decisions, for instance, will often be supported by a 
written elaboration of both the facts as understood by the court and the 
reasons for the overall decision.313  So long as there are sufficiently strong 
norms of sincerity and candor in the articulation of these facts and 
reasons,314 such writings might provide an acceptable source of data as to 
the motivating factual understanding underlying a given outcome.  But 
many other methods of resolving cases leave no paper trail.  Settlements are 
often kept secret and are usually unaccompanied by an explanation of the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 309  In such a system, a “10 out of 10” might indicate that the original decision maker and the 
evaluator agreed on all of the facts that were important to the result, while a “0 out of 10” would indicate 
total disagreement.  Most results, of course, would be intermediate values that represent partial, rather 
than total, agreement. 
 310  See Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why Do Courts Continue to Rely 
on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1028–31 (2002). 
 311  See id. (describing the behavioral qualities that modern-day psychiatrists use to delimit mental 
illness).  
 312  See Deyo, supra note 69, at 66. 
 313  See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
 314  See generally Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008) (defining and 
discussing the norms of judicial sincerity and candor).  
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lawyers’ view of the case, in part due to practice conventions and in part 
due to professional confidentiality obligations.315  Jury verdicts (in the 
absence of special verdict forms) are shrouded in mystery.316  And 
sometimes, decisions may be the product of negotiation among parties with 
differing factual understandings, so that no one mind can be said to possess 
the full set of factual understandings that “motivate” the overall result. 
These obstacles make it harder to implement systematic measurement 
of case outcome accuracy, but they do not make it impossible.  Parties 
could be asked to voluntarily permit their lawyers to describe and disclose 
their view of cases as part of research programs, and jurors could similarly 
be asked to articulate their views of the case after a trial is concluded.  If 
voluntary rates of participation were high enough, acceptably valid and 
reliable data might be collected.  But herein lurks a problem; so long as 
disclosure is voluntary, individual research efforts might always be 
frustrated by holdouts who refuse to disclose relevant information, and we 
will never be able to know with confidence whether the data of those who 
voluntarily disclose is representative of the set of people who refuse.  A 
more promising approach—although a harder one to realize—would be to 
amend existing procedures and professional obligations to require such 
disclosures as part of the duties of lawyers and jurors, while creating a 
corresponding duty of confidentiality on the part of any researchers who 
gain access to such information.  
So the motivational-facts component of the accuracy measure could be 
systematically acquired at modest cost, provided that we are either able to 
establish a norm of widespread voluntary explanations by decision makers 
or else establish mandatory duties to the same effect.  What, then, of the 
other half of the puzzle, the historical facts?  Here we have a harder 
challenge, as we lack an existing mechanism, external to the legal process, 
capable of providing a gold standard picture of what events truly occurred 
that gave rise to the lawsuit.   
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 315  See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 869–70 (2007) (noting that most settlements are confidential and that courts 
almost never order disclosure of confidential settlement terms).  The obstacle of lawyer confidentiality 
obligations has an interesting parallel in the history of medicine.  One of the great obstacles to the 
introduction of scientific methods to medical practice was the longstanding opposition of European 
religious organizations to the dissection of cadavers.  The relaxation of this norm was a crucial 
ingredient in early attempts to put traditional medical theories to the test.  See discussion supra Part I. 
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The malpractice-litigation studies I discussed above may provide us 
with the kernel of an accuracy measurement design that could be 
implemented more broadly.317  Researchers in several of those studies 
retained physicians to review insurance files and medical records in order to 
determine whether they indicated adverse events, whether those adverse 
events were caused by medical negligence, and also the degree to which the 
patient suffered a disability.318  This approach has some notable strengths: It 
employs subject matter experts with some expertise in the relevant domain, 
and it shields them from knowledge regarding how the legal system had 
resolved the claims, lessening the risk that they will be biased toward 
confirming its outcomes.  And it guides the reference-standard evaluators 
by focusing their attention on variables of particular legal interest.  
Unfortunately, with the doctors’ expertise may come a different form of 
bias: because they identify with other members of their profession, doctors 
may be less likely to attribute injuries to medical causes or find medical 
behavior to be negligent.319  Also, having them code for a legal conclusion 
(negligence) meant that the data they produced combines normative 
impulses with factual assessment in a way that obstructs an attempt to focus 
on the factual validity of the results.  That is, it is hard to say, on the basis 
of these studies, whether the “errors” involve misunderstandings of medical 
information or disagreements about what sort of errors deserve 
compensation.  Finally, a focus on medical records or insurance files as the 
sole source of independent data may itself bias the results, especially if 
doctors, nurses, and insurers are reluctant to record some types of bad 
behavior.  By addressing these deficiencies, we might approach a form of 
assessment we could justifiably claim as a gold standard for purposes of 
measuring the impact of procedures on juridical accuracy.   
First, if the reference-standard evaluators are aware of the outcomes of 
the cases they are reviewing, then there is a risk that they will either be 
biased toward confirming those results or towards labeling them as 
erroneous.320  For this reason, a gold standard reference evaluation should 
have full access to case files but be as blind as possible to case outcomes.  
Second, we should try to provide our evaluators with as much 
independent data as possible so that they do not merely replicate the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 317  See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 318  See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 268, at 1964. 
 319  See Studdert et al., supra note 268, at 2031–32. 
 320  See STRAUS ET AL., supra note 122, at 72 (noting that some seemingly “hard” measurement 
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mistakes of the system they are studying.  Crucially, this means that case 
records alone may be an insufficient source of information, especially for 
cases resolved early on with little discovery or investigation.  Ideally, 
evaluators should know all that the parties and lawyers know.  In order to 
approach this ideal, evaluators should be given access to full accounts of the 
facts underlying the dispute from all the parties, lawyers, and witnesses, 
with issues of confidentiality and privilege waived for the purposes of 
investigation.   
Clearly, for such a system to be effective, parties would have to have 
sufficient assurance that their unvarnished and candid accounts would not 
subsequently be used against them in court.  A critical part of any such 
assessment process is that the information obtained is kept fully private and 
is never used to alter the results reached by the legal process.  As a result, 
we must keep secret the errors detected by such methods on an individual 
basis so that we can reliably report the accuracy of the system as a whole. 
There is also a difficult tension present between making evaluations 
blind to actual outcomes and making them fully informed.  The more 
deeply evaluators probe the facts underlying a dispute, the greater the risk 
that a party or other individual involved in a case will deliberately or 
inadvertently reveal information regarding how the case actually turned out.  
Hopefully, such concerns could be minimized if all involved understood 
both the value of keeping such information from being disclosed, and also 
that the evaluators’ judgment could have no effect on the outcome that had 
actually been achieved.   
Third, the best means of measuring accuracy will be one that separates 
out those components of decision making that are factual in nature from 
those that are discretionary or normative.321  Once our evaluators have 
combed through the statements of parties, witnesses, lawyers, and relevant 
documents, they can then prepare their own account of what most likely 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 321  The conflation of normative and factual accuracy is a problem that is endemic to much of the 
studies that have actually attempted to measure accuracy.  Of course, it may also be useful to compare a 
decision maker’s understanding of relevant law (or even relevant norms) with some sort of reference 
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incorrect).  Some studies along these lines might be useful; for instance, it might be instructive to see 
how well attorneys engaging in early settlements understand the law that would govern their cases.   
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occurred in the past giving rise to the dispute.  Because this process is 
aimed at assessing the legal system’s performance—rather than producing 
binary outcomes between innocence and guilt or liability and non-
liability—evaluators should not express certainty where none exists.  
Rather, an appropriate procedure would be for the evaluator to create a 
narrative in which she indicated both those facts that were clear and those 
that were subject to significant uncertainty.  Once the narrative statement 
was complete, the evaluator could be given access to the actual decision in 
the case (if that decision involves enough factual components to be 
analyzable for accuracy) or to an account prepared by a decision maker of 
his reasons for reaching a particular result.  The evaluator could then score 
that decision on a scale that allowed her to distinguish between those 
resolutions that were strongly supported by the underlying facts, those that 
were made on an ambiguous record, and those that ran strongly against the 
most likely version of past events.  Alternatively, if the research question 
involves comparing some non-factual aspect of a decision (like a damages 
amount) with the underlying facts of cases, the evaluator’s account can be 
used as a source for identifying which cases involve the relevant facts and 
which do not.   
Establishing such a system would require thoughtful choices about how 
we could best ensure that evaluators work hard to evaluate cases closely and 
avoid bias to the extent that is humanly achievable.  One important issue is 
deciding whom to use as evaluators.  There are many plausible options, 
such as using lawyers retained on a special-master model, subject-matter 
experts (as in many of the malpractice litigation studies), retired judges, or 
even intelligent non-lawyers in something approximating a jury model.  
Whoever is chosen, the research design would need to incorporate 
periodic checking of the evaluators’ reliability.  There are several tests that 
could be conducted to maintain confidence in our evaluators.  Those in 
charge could assign multiple coders to evaluate the same cases, in order to 
test measurement reliability (or how likely it is that the measurement 
system would code the same case the same way in repeated encounters).322  
The researchers could also personally review a sampling of their results and 
the supporting evidence to get some sense of the validity of the 
measurements by seeing how closely the evaluative summaries track the 
supporting materials.  And as a final validity check, test cases for which 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 322  See, e.g., James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Gender and U.S. Supreme Court Oral Argument 
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historical facts are reliably known could be inserted into the measurement 
stream from time to time to give a further basis for coding validity analysis.  
Indeed, a comparison of how reliable and valid the work of different 
evaluators is would be useful not just in monitoring their performance and 
incentivizing careful work, but also in making long-run decisions about 
who to turn to and how much to pay for the work.  It may turn out that 
educated laypeople do as well or better than lawyers, in which case we 
might find that a great deal of evaluation can be obtained at relatively 
acceptable cost.  It might also turn out that retired judges or subject matter 
experts are so superior that review by anyone else cannot plausibly be 
considered a gold standard against which to test litigation results.  Absent 
experience with such systems, further speculation as to the best choice for 
reference-standard evaluators would be of little use. 
Some may wish to object to any reference-standard evaluators we might 
select on the grounds that, regardless of the individual merits of those 
evaluators, they will operate at a disadvantage to viewers of a live oral trial, 
with its special rituals of cross-examination and its opportunity to observe 
witness demeanor while testifying as an aid to making credibility calls.  
This concern, however, would be weaker than it initially appears.  First, 
most civil or criminal cases are not resolved through a trial on the merits, 
but rather through a settlement or a pre-trial procedural dismissal.323  Thus, 
even if we worry that an inquisitorial-style reference evaluation lacks some 
reliability features associated with trials, it could still be made more 
accurate than a modal case resolution, given its greater access to case 
information and its lack of distortions due to cost constraints or disparities 
in litigation resources between parties.  Second, contrary to received 
wisdom, live trials may not offer systematic accuracy advantages over 
paper-based fact-finding.  Although live trials offer some benefits in terms 
of clarifying and simplifying complex case information, they also come at a 
cost: they may decrease the accuracy of detecting insincere or mistaken 
testimony, and they may also provide extra sources of appearance-driven 
bias that skew case evaluations.324  Thus, there are good reasons to think 
that a well-funded and well-motivated investigation by an intelligent 
individual with complete access to both the facts in a case record and to 
concealed confidential information would usually meet, and sometimes 
exceed, the typical accuracy of the existing litigation system. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 323  See Spottswood, supra note 290, at 828. 
 324  See id. at 835–51. 
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If we were willing to take the steps needed to establish such a system, 
there is a good chance that it would substantially increase our ability to 
acquire useful answers to a wide variety of procedural questions.  For 
instance, we could gain useful insight into long-running debates on the best 
method of judicial selection by comparing the overall accuracy rates 
achieved by competing methods, controlling as far as we can for other 
confounding differences.325  Alternatively, we could compare different 
areas of the law or different procedural regimes and see which do a better 
job at understanding the facts of cases.  Likewise, we could compare the 
accuracy of resolutions at different stages in the lives of cases, and learn if 
pretrial decisions broadly correspond with the results in factually similar 
cases that go to trial, or if settlement amounts vary appropriately depending 
on the factual strength of the underlying case.  Finally, we could use such 
measurement as a basis for truly evidence-based design of judicial 
procedures by conducting either randomized experiments or well-designed 
observational studies that assess the impacts of different procedural rule 
alternatives on the overall accuracy of the factual understandings that 
produce case outcomes, combined with assessments of the perceived 
fairness, cost, and time-to-decision of those procedures.326  With such data 
in hand, we could make informed procedural policy decisions when we try 
and balance among these variables rather than relying on our (often wrong) 
intuitions about the ways that different rule regimes will play out in 
practice. 
Consider a concrete example already discussed at some length above: 
the right-to-counsel debate.327  Armed with tools described above, we could 
answer the question that is most important in these debates, but which even 
the most sophisticated, randomized experiments have been unable to probe.  
Imagine that we have identified an area in which appointed counsel does 
seem to improve their client’s chances of prevailing, perhaps by means of a 
randomized experiment.  This might be good or bad news: perhaps the 
lawyers are helping people with bad claims or defenses confuse judges and 
win what they are not entitled to through perjury and fancy lawyering.328  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 325  Cf. CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 128–39 
(2009); PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY 27–28 (1980); Mary L. Volcansek, Judicial Elections and American Exceptionalism: 
A Comparative Perspective, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 817–19 (2011). 
 326  See Posner, supra note 144, at 374–77; Walker, supra note 144, at 67–68. 
 327  See discussion supra Part III. 
 328  Cf. Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and 
the O.J. Simpson Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 299–317 (1998) (describing the tactics 
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Conversely, perhaps appointed lawyers are helping people with good claims 
but low advocacy skills obtain results that they deserve.329  An assessment 
of the validity of the factual understandings of the relevant decision makers 
could provide a useful partial answer, telling us whether the lawyers were 
improving success by increasing rates of confusion or by better educating 
judges.  If a random experiment was combined with a measure of the degree 
to which decision makers’ justifications for their decisions corresponded 
with the results of gold standard independent evaluations, we might be able 
to get a better grasp on whether, in a given type of case, appointing counsel 
provides a general social benefit or merely a narrow parochial benefit for 
their clients. 
Similarly, such an approach could shed valuable light on the 
Twombly/Iqbal debate.  Recall that the question of true theoretical interest 
is whether the heightened pleading standard propounded by the Supreme 
Court successfully weeds out frivolous claims before discovery while 
allowing most non-frivolous claims to proceed.330  An accuracy-
measurement design could be useful, in the first instance, by providing 
descriptive statistics about how well judges do at understanding the 
underlying facts of cases at the motion-to-dismiss phase of a case.  This 
alone could be valuable information, but we could learn much more if we 
conducted a controlled experimental trial comparing different pleading-
review approaches.  By randomly assigning some cases to a Twombly/Iqbal 
standard and some to the pre-existing regime, tracking them to completion, 
and comparing the overall accuracy of all results, we could learn whether 
the new standard raises or lowers the accuracy of the outcomes in cases it 
applies to.  This might not tell us all we would wish to know about these 
cases; even if the new regime tends to be more accurate on average, it might 
be objectionable if, for instance, it tended to deter some claims by 
meritorious plaintiffs from being filed.331  But knowing whether or not the 
                                                                                                                           
that enabled the O.J. Simpson defense team to obtain an acquittal). 
 329  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 330  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 331  It might be possible to detect such an effect by tracking incidents of injury and seeing how many 
result in a filed complaint under either set of rules.  See, e.g., A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between 
Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 248 (1991) 
(finding that out of 280 incidents involving medical negligence—as defined by a medical review 
panel—only 8 patients filed malpractice claims).  But conducting a true experiment along these lines 
would most likely involve difficult trade-offs.  On the one hand, there is a need to implement 
experimental and control procedures on a geographically widespread and long-term basis in order to 
allow enough information about the consequences of rules to percolate down into the decision making 
processes of potential plaintiffs.  See Abramowicz et al., supra note 144, at 978.  On the other, there is a 
need to avoid confounding effects from other causes that might influence accuracy over long time 
scales, as well as the effects of forum-shopping by plaintiffs who have been geographically “assigned” 
to one condition but can pragmatically elect to use a different one.  And of course, realistically detecting 
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Supreme Court’s basic intuition regarding the value of plausibility 
screening is correct would be enormously helpful in deciding whether its 
new standard should be preserved or uprooted.    
Having suggested that such an institution might be possible and very 
useful, I must emphasize that it cannot be a panacea for all juridical ills.   
For one thing, data collection of this sort, that works to generate simple 
measures that can compare widely different types of cases, can be very 
useful for testing hypotheses, but it will not do the hard work of generating 
them.  Designing good research on the causal effects of procedure will 
require not just powerful means of comparing outcomes, but also a steady 
increase in our understandings of how procedural systems function at a 
theoretic level.  To go back to the medical parallel, we would not do nearly 
as well if we had an extensive drug testing process but no knowledge of the 
internal composition of the human body.  Indeed, historically a great deal of 
the early progress in making medicine a more scientific enterprise arose not 
from widespread experimentation comparing therapies and controls, but 
rather from the new availability of cadavers for dissection and an increased 
attention to nuanced evaluation of patient symptoms.332  In the litigation 
realm, this translates into a need for a combined approach, where theories 
are developed based on close and sophisticated observation of cases, 
preferably with maximal access to private information, as well as through 
controlled experiments in artificial scenarios, and then tested in larger, real-
world samples with appropriate controls for confounding variables and 
measurement of effects.  If we are to achieve long-run optimization of 
procedural systems, theory and empirical analysis will have to walk hand-
in-hand. 
Ultimately we will need more than just promising theories and a design 
that enables us to test them; we will also need money.  Perhaps the reason 
that a system along these lines has never been tried is that conducting an 
investigation into the accuracy of competing procedural regimes requires 
resources well beyond what juridical policy scholars normally spend.  
Indeed, the very nature of crafting a gold standard investigation 
contemplates that some case measurements will cost more than was spent 
on the original litigation.333  If the judicial process has compiled a less-than-
complete record, the reference-standard evaluator will need to expend more 
resources independently investigating the dispute. 
                                                                                                                           
all the sources of injury that might lead to a lawsuit and keeping track of whether they do, in fact, 
produce one is a task of near-Sisyphean magnitude.  As a result, it may be extremely difficult to 
meaningfully measure the impact of differing rules on potential plaintiffs’ willingness to sue. 
 332  See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 333  This is most likely to be the case in low-cost administrative settings or when evaluating case 
outcomes that arise through very early settlements or pleading dismissals.   
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The cost barrier is probably the biggest obstacle towards conducting 
this sort of research, but it might be surmountable.  Note that in some 
settings, such as the approval of new pharmaceutical drugs, we are willing 
to bear quite high costs to be sure that our interventions are better than the 
status quo.  As discussed above, our society expends hundreds of millions 
of dollars in evaluation costs for each new pharmaceutical drug we allow to 
be marketed.334  We are willing, in other words, to spend lots of money to 
ensure that medical treatments are effective at improving our health, 
perhaps in part due to the high costs of treating serious diseases 
ineffectively.   
Perhaps reformers could similarly mobilize political decision makers to 
invest in accuracy tracking by relying on the dramatic string of DNA-based 
exonerations of serious felony convictions.335  Indeed, one special point of 
leverage that reformers might employ is that policy makers will likely 
expect the results of such studies to confirm their pre-existing views 
regarding good procedural policy.336  Thus, even though many studies may 
reach conclusions that undermine the preferred policies of legislators or rule 
makers, they may be willing to support them because, ex ante, most of them 
will expect such investigations to provide support. 
Moreover, we need not, and should not, collect so much data about all 
of the cases in our court systems at any one time.  One way to keep costs 
down is to focus on those adjudicative settings or questions that are 
particularly worrying, and do targeted studies that are large enough to 
obtain relevant data, but not so large that the costs become 
overwhelming.337  For instance, if we are very concerned (as some are)338 
about the quality of the decision making in immigration courts, we could 
embark on a research project comparing the factual judgments of 
Immigration Judges (“IJs”) with those of independent evaluators given 
access to case data, the applicants, and appropriate country information.  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 334  See DiMasi et al., supra note 109, at 180 (estimating an average out-of-pocket cost of $403 
million per new drug brought to new market, with a total capitalized cost of $802 million).  Although 
drug companies will often be able to recapture these costs by bringing valuable new products to market, 
the legal system does not operate as a for-profit enterprise and thus it is likely that similar research 
would require significant governmental or private funding sources. 
 335  See generally GARRETT, supra note 16, at 1–13. 
 336  See Abramowicz et al., supra note 144, at 985. 
 337  See id. at 962. 
 338  See, e.g., Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (“In the year 
ending on the date of the argument, different panels of this court reversed the Board of Immigration 
Appeals in whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of . . . petitions . . . that were resolved on the 
merits.”). 
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This could be used both to get descriptive statistics on how well IJs are 
doing in general on this measure, and also to test the efficacy of specific 
reforms via either random assignment, if possible and politically feasible, or 
a second-best solution using some sort of statistical control technique and 
observational data.   
Similarly, if we are particularly concerned about the impact of 
discovery costs on civil litigation and think that some new procedure might 
improve on the status quo, we could conduct a targeted experiment 
comparing the new and old rules in a few select jurisdictions, evaluating the 
impact of the new rule not just on legal costs but also on legal accuracy.  
Thus, we would be able to distinguish reforms that cut costs or delay in a 
beneficial way from those that trim away cost by dispensing with justice.  
Over the long term, such investigations might save far more social costs 
than they generate. 
Of course, if we found such an approach helpful with respect to discrete 
questions, we might want to implement a broader system of monitoring that 
would enable many different research questions to be answered over time, 
and enable inter-system and inter-temporal comparisons of many kinds.  
Coupled with a regulatory regime that required randomized experimental 
trials of new rules and publication of data regarding the differential impacts 
of those proposals on the cost, time-to-completion, perceived fairness, and 
factual accuracy of case resolutions, we might truly be able to embark on a 
project of evidence-based procedure reform.  For that to work, however, we 
would need a means of keeping costs to a manageable level.   
One method of keeping costs down, while still generating data that may 
allow reasonably accurate inferences regarding an overall system, is 
randomly selecting a small percentage of cases in the system to be 
measured.  For instance, we almost certainly could not find money in the 
federal budget to pay for systematic accuracy measurement over all federal 
civil cases, but it might be feasible to randomly choose 3,000 (out of a total 
of around 300,000) cases to be evaluated and coded each year.339  That 
might still allow large enough sub-samples of case subject matters and 
resolution-types to permit a great deal of useful data gathering, and if finer-
grained analysis was needed, cases could be gathered over a multi-year time 
frame into a larger sample.   
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 339  See Posner, supra note 144, at 375; U.S. COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS 2011 TABLE C (2011), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStat 
istics/2011/tables/C00Mar11.pdf (indicating that 285,603 civil cases were terminated by the federal 
courts in 2010, and that 324,190 were terminated in 2011). 
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Finally, we must also be realistic about what even a well-funded system 
of measurement along these lines is capable of achieving.  Even given an 
elaborate accuracy-measurement system, there are some theories that will 
be beyond our capability to test.  One central problem is that litigation rules 
do not only affect litigation conduct; they also affect out-of-court behavior 
and a party’s choice of forum in which to file claims.  So if one effect of 
legal rules is to deter filing of claims or shunt them into a different court 
system, a system that tracks factors like the cost, time-to-resolution, and 
accuracy of legal dispositions within that system will miss such an effect.  
The results could be very misleading data; if a new rule makes certain 
meritorious claims very hard to prove, it might lower the rate at which 
factually supportable claims are brought successfully even while the subset 
of claims actually filed stays the same.340   This is not a failure of such a 
research design—no tool can answer any possible question—but it is an 
important limitation.  Absent protocols that can follow large quantities of 
out-of-court behavior as well as the litigation process itself,341 we will be 
limited to exploring questions that ask what effects procedural rules have on 
litigation behavior alone, which may not always be what rule designers 
would wish to know in a perfect informational world.342  
So an evidence-based movement in procedural design probably is 
achievable, but would require shifts in confidentiality norms, new reporting 
obligations for many legal actors, and a willingness to absorb significant 
new costs.  Should reformers band together to push for such large changes 
to the way we evaluate procedural success and failure?  In the end, it 
depends on a number of factors and admits of no easy answers.  For those 
who, like me, think we have little warrant for believing that our system is 
fairly accurate on average and think that accuracy is one of the most 
important qualities that a litigation system can possess, the proposal may be 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 340  See Localio et al., supra note 331, at 247–48. 
 341  See discussion supra Part V. 
 342  One potential means of filling this gap might involve careful, cross-jurisdictional matching 
studies designed to closely approximate a controlled experiment.  Such a design would involve two key 
elements.  First, it would be necessary to have a way of sampling the frequency of law violations in a 
particular context.  See e.g.,  Brennan et al., supra note 268, at 1964 (sampling from medical case files to 
detect base rates of adverse medical events caused by negligence, and comparing such base rates with 
rates of filed claims).  Second, variations in claiming rates due to variations in procedural or evidentiary 
rules might be detected through careful regression or matching analyses that aim to isolate the effect of 
the procedures from potential confounding covariance.  Such analysis will necessarily leave more 
uncertainty on the table than a true experiment, but it is probably the only viable means of obtaining data 
on these questions, given the implausibility of randomly assigning individuals to differing rule regimes 
long before they have reason to sue or defend against a claim.  
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attractive.  Others may doubt either of those two propositions, and so will 
be unwilling to bear the large transitional costs involved in creating a truly 
evidence-based litigation-design movement. 
VI. SMALL STEPS TOWARDS AN ACCURACY MEASUREMENT CULTURE 
Given that the large transformation I describe is hard to envision and 
that many will be reluctant to bear its costs, some readers may wonder 
whether the discussion above has any relevance for real-world litigation 
research and practice.  Luckily, a focus on what a strong evidence-based 
litigation reform movement might involve also provides clues as to ways 
we can modestly improve existing methods of assessing, designing, and 
implementing procedural rules. 
First, whether or not a large-scale program of validity evaluation for 
legal outcomes is implemented, procedural analysts can benefit from 
thinking about the gulf between those things that are typically measured in 
empirical studies about litigation rules and the factors of deepest relevance 
for evaluating rule optimality.  One implication of this discussion is that we 
should be very cautious in drawing normative conclusions about the 
desirability of procedural options based on experiments and statistical data 
that only measure part of the relevant values.  So long as studies are 
confined to describing who benefits from rules, how long it takes for cases 
to be resolved, and how much parties spend in the process, we may learn 
much about which interest groups stand to benefit from differing rule 
regimes, but we will know little about the broader social desirability of such 
regimes.  Choosing to advocate for reforms that benefit some classes of 
litigants more than others without any assessment of the factual merits of 
their cases amounts to either political rhetoric or fairly shallow policy 
analysis.  Some plaintiffs who lose deserve to win, others who win deserve 
to lose, and any policy reform suggestion that does not treat the two 
distinctly has little to recommend it.   
To be sure, the factual-validity measurement protocol I describe above 
could never fully capture “who deserves to win,” because in some cases the 
answer to that question will require normative and political judgment that 
lies beyond the limits of empirical analysis.  But often in litigation, there 
would be broad agreement on a social level about who deserves to win and 
who to lose if only we could identify which claims were factually 
supportable and which were not.  Until legal empirical research can find 
ways of tackling such questions, we must treat empirically derived 
recommendations in favor of particular procedural regimes with a large 
grain of salt. 
96 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:25 
 
Luckily, for those who are interested in conducting empirical research 
and who are sensitive to the critique above, there will be an abundance of 
research questions that can be delved into at relatively modest cost using 
the methods I have described.  Tracking data that integrates cost, fairness, 
and validity data for all types of resolutions in the civil justice system will 
be hard, but smaller, more manageable projects might focus on simpler 
settings, such as administrative court systems or small arbitrations.  In such 
arenas, the variety of legal issues and methods of case resolution will likely 
be smaller, as will the amount of relevant information needed for 
independent analysis of the underlying facts.   
For questions of pressing interest about the formal court system, grant 
funding might enable localized research that incorporates validity 
assessment into a study design, although in the absence of broader reforms 
such studies will face challenges gaining voluntary access to sufficient data 
given existing confidentiality obligations.  And some such projects may be 
made even more feasible if the research question of interest does not require 
a type of analysis that is sensitive to all of the different ways that a case 
might be resolved.  For instance, imagine a rule changing the manner in 
which evidence is presented to juries.  Assessing the true overall effect of 
such a rule would require a design that could capture the ways that earlier 
litigation behavior changes in response to it, but a critic might still find it 
useful to demonstrate that jury verdicts employing the new rule are, on 
average, less factually accurate than verdicts employing the status-quo 
control.343  Such studies might profitably be conducted using relatively 
small samples of cases, and could therefore be much more affordable than 
the type of systematic monitoring I sketched above. 
Judges can also aid in the development of more informed procedural 
design by treating the goal of making data available as among the 
considerations that guide their choices.  For instance, even though existing 
randomized procedural trials have important limits, they still tell us much 
more than the alternative of poorly controlled observational studies.  When 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 343  Such an investigation may work better for certain types of evidence rules than others.  One can 
imagine, for instance, that expert evaluations of the validity of verdicts could tell us a great deal about 
the comparative usefulness of two different types of scientific-evidence rules.  By contrast, it is hard to 
see how we could justifiably investigate the utility of prejudice-based exclusions just by comparing the 
results of a system employing such methods to a fully informed reference-standard evaluation.  A critic 
of such a study could justifiably worry that, if prejudice reduces verdict accuracy, fully informed 
investigators are just as likely to suffer from it as juries.  See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780–84 (2001) (presenting evidence that professional judges, just like 
jurors, fall prey to cognitive errors and biases). 
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acting as local rule makers, judges can aid in the production of data by 
adopting new rules in full only after testing them in a randomized fashion 
while encouraging litigants to consent to measurement efforts.344   
Moreover, judges can also help researchers accumulate data merely by 
staying out of the way.  One significant problem in assessing the current 
landscape of procedural rules in America is that many procedural practices 
have been constitutionalized.345  As I discussed above, the literature on 
Civil Gideon shows that it is harder than one might initially expect to 
conclude that providing counsel to the indigent is a benefit in all types of 
cases.346  Yet, because of Gideon itself, we may never be able to know 
whether the right to appointed criminal counsel is more clearly beneficial 
than the civil versions that have been studied experimentally.  Grounding a 
procedural rule in the federal Constitution makes it much harder to know 
whether that rule is actually worthwhile.  That does not mean that there will 
never be cases where the benefits of a rule are so clear that no one can see a 
need for future data,347 but it does mean that the standard of evidence we 
demand before adopting new constitutional procedural rules should be 
particularly high. 
A few further points may be useful to both judges and rule makers.  
One of the things that makes it very hard to tell how procedural rules 
impact adjudicative accuracy is the problem of hidden factual information.  
Judges, and those who read the opinions of judges to learn about the 
system’s functioning, get only a limited window into the true spectrum of 
information about cases, especially the vast majority that are resolved 
during the pretrial process.  Lawyers and parties probably know much 
more, including facts that were never disclosed during the litigation.  
Because of this, practicing litigators may have a more finely tuned sense for 
how often the process reaches a result that rests on dubious factual 
assumptions than judges or outside observers do.  This may mean that those 
methods of making rules that draw more heavily on the input of practicing 
lawyers may have advantages over those that rely mostly on the work of 
judges.  Lawyers, of course, may be biased in favor of rules that may aid 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 344  See Tobias, supra note 144, at 1324–25 (urging a reform to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
to make such experimentation easier). 
 345  See e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 346  See Barton, supra note 224, at 1232–33. 
 347  Cf. Abramowicz et al., supra note 144, at 973 (advising that “[w]e should not allow randomized 
tests of parachutes because we already have strong evidence that they are effective” and that similar 
principles apply whenever we have no need to collect data in order to choose intelligently between 
policies). 
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client bases with whom they have a special relationship; any such input, 
therefore, would need to balance the input of differing segments of the bar.  
This observation, therefore, is one reason to favor procedural rules 
generated by the federal rule making process, which does incorporate 
lawyer input from a wide segment of practice areas, over rules that are 
purely judge-made.   
Lastly, this discussion generates one final caution for rule makers.  
Some scholars have recently suggested that our government institutions 
should develop systematic policies requiring that new rules be 
experimentally tested before they can be implemented.348  In theory, such an 
approach could have many benefits.  However, the value of an experimental 
protocol will always depend on the usefulness of the questions it can ask.  It 
would be a grave mistake, therefore, to choose procedural rules by running 
experiments that show their impacts on factors like cost with no means of 
validating outcome quality.  Until we attempt to measure the impact of our 
procedures on the accuracy of case outcomes, experiments can tell us who 
will benefit from new rules and how much those new rules will cost, but not 
whether the changes are improving or worsening the quality of the justice 
provided by our institutions.  Data of that sort may do more harm than good 
in the procedural policy making arena. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Even after centuries, the medical profession still wrestles to 
systematically condition its policies and choices on evidence.  Nevertheless, 
few can deny that the combination of careful investigation and theorizing 
about disease in the human body, coupled with an increased willingness to 
demand that interventions be experimentally validated before they are 
implemented, has resulted in an astonishing increase in the effectiveness of 
medical treatments compared with what prevailed a few hundred years ago.   
If those who shape litigation environments wish to imitate the successes 
of medicine, they will operate with some advantages: litigation is a social 
process, not a biochemical one, and the ease of observing its operations 
means that it will be easier to devise plausible theories about how it works 
than it was to develop useful biomedical ideas.  But when it comes to 
testing those theories, lawyers operate at a disadvantage: the health of a 
human body can be measured in numerous ways, some of which cost very 
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little, but we will face large challenges if we commit ourselves to measuring 
the accuracy of legal results.   
The approach I sketched out in this Article, which attempts to separate 
out the factual accuracy component of case outcomes and systematically 
compare it with an independent, gold standard reference evaluation, would 
be costly to implement but potentially very powerful.  It could answer many 
questions about the efficacy and optimality of competing procedural rules 
that are presently inaccessible to either observational or experimental 
testing.  Nevertheless, developing a culture willing to provide the rule 
structure and financial support necessary for large scale accuracy testing 
may be beyond our reach, especially if most lawyers and law scholars 
believe that they can trust the procedural systems that we currently employ 
without testing their validity.   
Continuing to gamble on the optimality of existing procedures seems 
untenable given the large downsides of being wrong, which include the 
human misery of the wrongfully convicted, the financial and emotional 
harms of imposing inappropriate liability on innocent parties, the injustice 
suffered by those who deserve social benefits but are denied them, and the 
social waste perpetrated by those who successfully claim benefits they 
should not receive.  It is a near certainty that all of these forms of injustice 
happen nearly every day in our society, but they are mostly hidden from our 
view, in part because the public credibility of those who dispute a result 
blessed by the legal system is extraordinarily low.  Whether we can develop 
an evidence-based litigation reform movement depends largely on how 
much we are willing to pay to reduce such uncertain, but potentially grave, 
harms.  
 
  
